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THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN 
UNITY AND ITS ROLE IN REGIONAL 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT: A CRITICAL EVALUATION 
P. MWETI MUNYA* 
A purely contemporary view of any problem is necessarily a limited 
and even distorted view. Every situation has its roots in the past 
. . . the past survives into the present; the present is indeed the 
past undergoing modifications. l 
INTRODUCTION 
Mrica has never experienced a lasting peace. Peace and stability 
proved elusive in pre-colonial and colonial Mrica. The scourges of the 
slave trade, inter-tribal warfare and the imposition of colonialism did 
not allow it. One would expect emancipation and independence to 
have created an era of stability and relative peace. Instead, post-colo-
nial Africa has experienced conflicts of a scale and magnitude hereto-
fore unwitnessed. Pre-colonial Mrica may have been volatile, but the 
rudimentary nature of the weapons and the unsophisticated organiza-
tional structure of the societies made conflicts disruptive and adven-
turous rather than catastrophic. The emergence of an artificially con-
structed modern state with internal contradictions and a sophisticated 
state apparatus and weaponry, coupled with the presence of external 
forces, has made Mrica one of the most unstable regions in the world, 
and has made creation of peace prospects a daunting task. 
Of course, conflict and civil wars have not been exclusive to the 
Mrican continent. Two world wars marked a dark period in the world. 
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communist hegem-
* Research Associate, International and Graduate Legal Studies Program, University of Geor-
gia School of Law. University of Nairobi, ILB. 1994; Free University of Brussels (VUB), LL.M. 
1996; University of Georgia, LL.M. 1997. The author owes a debt of gratitude to Professor Gabriel 
Wilner of the University of Georgia School of Law for his insightful comments on an earlier draft 
of this paper and his immeasurable support in numerous other ways. 
I Celestine O. Bassey, Retrospects and Prospects of Political Stability in Nigeria, 32 AFR. STUD. 
REv. 97, 97 (1989) (citing S. PHILLIPSON & S. ADEBO, THE NIGERIANIZATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE 
(1954». 
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. ony in Eastern and Central Europe, states were plunged into tribal and 
ethnic conflagrations hitherto prevented by Communist socio-political 
order. This indicates that ethno-nationalism has re-emerged in the 
Western Hemisphere as well. 
Africa was not spared the adverse repercussions of the end of the 
Cold War either. While superpower-sponsored conflicts during the 
Cold War were low-key, albeit protracted, due to the balance of power 
in the region, post-Cold War conflicts have been marked by unparal-
leled rapidity and devastating consequences. The situation has been 
worsened by the dwindling of Africa's geopolitical importance in the 
post-Cold War era. Africa's traditional allies in the non-aligned move-
ment and former Communist bloc have recapitulated due to post-Cold 
War economic hardships. The result has been a general lack of con-
cern with what happens in Africa. While the United States and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organizaion (NATO) were prepared to inter-
vene in Haiti to restore a democratic regime and in the former Yugo-
slavia to end "ethnic cleansing," no one is willing to intervene to avert 
a bloodbath in Rwanda or Sierra Leone. No strategic Western interests 
are harmed there, and the United Nations Charter traditionally pro-
hibits intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Thus, the 
post-Cold War era, punctuated by forces of economic liberalization and 
dominance of the Bretton Woods institutions in the economic man-
agement of the developing countries, has not only accelerated the 
economic marginalization of Africa-placing her at the fringes of the 
global economy-but has als.o wrought insecurity in its wake. 
This post-Cold War "new order" only serves to emphasize the need 
for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to re-invent itself to cope 
with these new challenges. This article attempts to unmask these and 
other challenges facing the OAU, to critically examine the perform-
ance of the OAU in conflict resolution, and to offer suggestions on 
how the OAU can re-evaluate and reform itself to meet the old and 
new challenges that threaten the efforts to create lasting peace in 
Africa. 
There is no question that the OAU's historical record of success 
in conflict resolution is lacking. Perhaps this has to do with its history 
and constitution. The signing of the OAU Charter at Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia in May, 1963 was greeted with optimism and high expecta-
tions. Aspirations of unity in a continent hitherto divided by colonial-
ism had reached fruition. The polarizing differences experienced in 
the preceding preparatory conferences had been bridged, and the 
largest regional organization in the world at the time was born. How-
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ever, the OAU was not just an expression of continental efforts to 
achieve unity; it was a culmination and a concrete expression of the 
aspirations of the Pan-Mrican movement, which dates back to the 
beginning of the twentieth century. 
Unfortunately, dismay and disillusionment replaced this early op-
timism. The ink had not even dried on the Charter before the conti-
nent was plagued by conflicts, civil wars and a myriad of other prob-
lems. The celebrated organization that many had hoped would con-
solidate continental security and nurture peace and stability had failed 
to do so. Instead, civil wars and inter-state conflicts, with their concomi-
tant humanitarian crises, have bedeviled the Mrican continent since 
independence, threatening to tear it apart. What went wrong? 
Many writers have attributed the problems of inter-state and intra-
state conflicts to the colonial legacy of artificial borders and the nature 
of the colonial state that was inherited after independence. Others 
have blamed the OAU Charter for the dismal performance of the OAU 
and its inability to resolve conflicts. The normative structure of the 
Charter, they argue, has an inherent tendency to encourage ineffec-
tiveness and ineptitude. The conservative application of the concepts 
of 1) non-interference with internal affairs of states and 2) respect for 
the sanctity of borders has rendered the OAU completely ineffective. 
Any objective view of the role the OAU has played in resolving 
regional conflicts must use the aforementioned historical and ideologi-
cal context, and internal as well as external forces, as the point of 
departure. This enables one to discern and appreciate the role of the 
OAU within the context of the complexities and intricacies of conflict 
situations in Mrica. 
By examining the role played by the OAU in regional conflict 
resolution and dispute settlement, I hope to contribute to this debate. 
Part I of this paper examines the Pan-Mrican roots of the OAU. Part 
II describes its purposes and principles. Part III examines its institu-
tional structure. The OAU's mechanisms of dispute resolution and 
case studies of its conflict resolution activities are discussed in Parts IV 
and V, respectively. Part VI assesses the role that the OAU has played 
in the arena of conflict resolution over the years. Finally, Part VII is a 
discussion of the legal and other impediments to effective conflict 
resolution in Mrica. 
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1. THE PAN-AFRICAN ORIGINS OF THE OAU 
Cultural and spiritual affinity among Mricans is an age-old phe-
nomenon that is exhibited worldwide in their poetry and music.2 In 
the nineteenth century, this affinity evolved into fraternal solidarity 
and eventually a formidable movement in the common struggle 
against racial discrimination.s The OAU is the present-day symbol and 
embodiment of the ideals of this early Pan-Mrican movement.4 
In its formative stages, the Pan-Mrican movement was led by black 
North American intellectuals.5 Among the most notable ones were 
W.E.B. Du Bois6 and Marcus Garvey,? although their approaches and 
philosophies differed. Beginning with the 1900 Westminster Confer-
ence, a series of Pan-Mrican conferences were organized to formulate 
goals for the advancement of black people and the protection of native 
Mricans from white settlers.s 
Mter World War II, Pan-Mricanism became a potent force in the 
struggle for independence from colonialism in Mrica.9 Commencing 
with the 1945 Manchester Congress, African intellectuals like Kwame 
Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor, Jomo Kenyatta and Sekou Toure took a 
center-stage in the movement. 10 Several conferences were organized in 
Mrica at the the beginning of the twentieth century which re-articu-
lated the vision and goals of the Pan-Mrican movement.ll Thus, the 
cause was transformed from a sentimentalized forum for racial solidar-
2 See Lawrence w. Levine, African Culture and Slavery in the United States, in GLOBAL DIMEN-
SIONS OF THE AnuCAN DIASPORA 99,103 Uoseph E. Harris ed., 2d ed. 1993). john Wideman 
writes that "rhythm and blues and rock 'n' roll are rooted in traditional African music .... " JOHN 
EDGAR WIDEMAN, BROTHERS AND KEEPERS 197 (1984). 
5 See ELENGA M'BUYINGA, PAN AFRICANISM OR NED-COLONIALISM?: THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE 
OA.U. 34-42 (Michael Pallis trans., 2d ed. 1982) (1979). 
4 See P. OLISANWUCHE ESEDEBE, PAN-AFRICANISM: THE IDEA AND MOVEMENT, 1776-1991, at 
192-225 (2d ed. 1994). 
5The man credited with coining the term "Pan-African Movement," Henry Sylvester Wil-
liams, was a West Indian lawyer who was then practicing law in London. See OWEN CHARLES 
, MATHURIN, HENRY SYLVESTER WILLIAMS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE PAN-AFRICAN MOVEMENT, 
1869-1911, at 52,55 (1976). 
6 See generaUy W.E.B. Du BOIS: A READER 637-92 (David Levering Lewis ed., 1995) (a compi-
lation of his essays and articles on Pan-Africanism). 
7 See generally MARCUS GARVEY AND THE VISION OF AFRICA Uon Henrik Clark ed., 1974) (gen-
eral summary of Garvey's work and philosophy). 
8 See RONALD W. WALTERS, PAN AFRICANISM IN THE AFRICAN DIASPORA: AN ANALYSIS OF 
MODERN AFROCENTRIC POLITICAL MOVEMENTS 205 (1993). 
9 See id. at 139-45. 
IOjON WORONOFF, ORGANIZING AnuCAN UNITY 22-23 (1970). 
II See Gordon Harris, Introduction to 7 ORGANIZATION OF AnuCAN UNITY ix (1994). 
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ity to a movement for self-determination of the Mrican people focused 
on the eradication of colonialism and the promotion of Mrican na-
tionalism.12 In this continental phase, the movement's goals included: 
complete political independence for the entire continent; fraternal 
cooperation between Mrican states; creation of a united Mrica based 
on a federation of sub-regional groups, within which there would be a 
limitation of national sovereignty; and non-interference by Mricans in 
the internal affairs of other states. 13 The following conferences that 
occurred in Mrica echoed these goals. 14 There was a consensus that 
regional cooperation and unity were crucial if the vast resources of 
Mrica were to be utilized for the prosperity of the continent and its 
people. 15 
However, the road to continental unity was full of obstacles. Inde-
pendent Mrican states emerged from colonialism to find themselves 
balkanized into regional and ideological groups that were, ironically, 
the fruits of the Pan-Mrican conferences. 16 The main post-indepen-
dence groups to precede the OAU included: the Brazzaville Group 
(composed of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Madagascar, 
the Peoples' Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, 
Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, Senegal, and Chad), formed in De-
cember, 1960;17 the Casablanca Group (composed of Ghana, Guinea, 
Libya, Mali, Morocco, the United Arab Republic and the Algerian 
Provisional Government), formed in January, 1961;18 the Monrovia 
Group (composed of Liberia, Somalia, Togo, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sierra 
Leone, Libya, and Tunisia), formed in May, 1961 ;19 and the Pan-African 
Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Mrica (PAF-
MECSA).20 
12 See WORONOFF, supra note 10, at 28-57. 
13 See ESEDEBE, supra note 4, at 158-59, 167-7l. 
14 See generally ESEDEBE, supra note 4, at 165-91 (describing conferences occurring between 
1958 and the OAU's formation in 1963). 
15 See id. at 176. 
16 See Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Maral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. 
J. INT'L L. 1113, 1114 (1995); cJ. WORONOFF, supra note 10, at 40 (discussing need for new states 
to resist attempts at balkanization by colonial powers' exertion of further economic control). 
17 SeeWORONOFF, supra note 10, at 96. 
18 See The African Charter of Casablanca, in BASIC DOCUMENTS OF AFRICAN REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 42-43 (Louis B. Sohn ed., 1971) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTSJ; WORONOFF, 
supra note 10, at 49-50. 
19 See Decisions of the Monrovia and Lagos Conferences, in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 
18, at 53-54; WORONOFF, supra note 10, 71-73. 
20 See RiCHARD Cox, PAN-AFRICANISM IN PRACTICE: AN EAST AFRICAN STUDY, 1958-1964, at 
1-4 (1964); WORONOFF, supra note 10, at 43-45. 
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The preparatory meetings for the May, 1963 Addis Ababa summit 
of Mrican leaders, which was to adopt a charter for continental unity, 
saw the Mrican states divided into two main ideological camps. The 
radical Casablanca group of states favored a continental union govern-
ment, while the more conservative Monrovia group desired a loose 
continental body of independent states.21 The Addis Ababa conference 
had to find a middle ground to appease these opposing groups. There-
fore, the OAU Charter emerged as a compromise document that has 
since lost its cutting edge.22 Instead of serving as a blueprint for conti-
nental political unification, as intended by the "progressive" forces, the 
Charter ultimately supported the status quo. This compromise is at the 
heart of the OAU conflict resolution and management crisis.23 It is 
argued that the Charter's norm of non-intervention in internal affairs 
of member states insulates internal conflicts from scrutiny and resolu-
tion by the OAU, and that the sanctification of national borders pre-
vents the OAU from addressing the problem of border conflicts.24 
The OAU cannot be divorced from the historical setting within 
which it was created. The OAU was formed at an epoch-making period 
when the Mrican states were emerging from colonial rule.25 It was 
natural that these newly independent states sought to safeguard their 
sovereignty from any future subjugation, while at the same time they 
adopted a common approach in the struggle against the remaining 
vestiges of colonialism.26 The aims and objectives of the OAU embody 
these Mrican concerns of the time and are not radically different from 
those of its predecessor, the Pan-Mrican movement. 
It is also important to recognize that the continental phase of the 
Pan-Mrican movement and the struggle against colonialism was domi-
nated by leaders of the pro-independence nationalist movements. 27 It 
was these leaders, propelled into the leadership of their respective 
states by the granting of independence, who converged at Addis Ababa 
21 SeeWORONOFF, supra note 10, at 97-99 (discussing Casablanca Group), 99-101 (discussing 
Monrovian Group). 
22 See infra Part VII.A. and accompanying notes. 
23 See id. 
24 See infra notes 310-14 and accompanying text. 
25 See James O.C.Jonah, The OAU: Peace &efting and Conflict Resolution, in THE ORGANIZA-
TION OF AFRICAN UNITY AFTER THIRTY YEARS 3-13 (Yassin El-Ayouty ed., 1994) [hereinafter THE 
OAU AFTER THIRTY YEARS]. 
26 See id. 
Z7 See generally HANS KoHN & WALLACE SOKOLSKY, AFRICAN NATIONALISM IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (1965) (tracing nationalist movements in different African counuies). 
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to form the GAU. Therefore, the domination of the institutional struc-
ture of the GAU by these leaders is not accidenta1. 28 
The preamble of the GAU Charter opens with the following 
words: 'We, the Heads of Mrican States and Governments assembled 
in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, ... have agreed to the present 
Charter. "29 This language underscores the predominant and exclusion-
ist role that the Mrican heads of state have played in the formation of 
the GAU.30 Contrast this preamble with that of the United Nations 
Charter, which starts with these words: 'We the peoples of the United 
Nations .... "31 The prefatory language to the United Nations Charter 
emphasizes the centrality of the people in the aims and objectives of 
the United Nations. The success or failure of the GAU is, therefore, 
consequently intertwined with the weaknesses or strengths of the Mri-
can heads of state: an indictment on the GAU is an indictment on the 
Mrican states' leadership. Indeed, the Mrican leaders constitute the 
supreme organ of the GAU-the "Assembly of Heads of State And 
Government. "!!2 
The efficiency and effectiveness of an organization is, to a large 
extent, determined by the nature ofits Charter-its architectural foun-
dation. It is, therefore, important to examine the basic tenets of the 
GAU Charter in order to appreciate how its provisions and structure 
impact on the capacity of the GAU to resolve conflicts and settle 
disputes. 
II. PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE OAU 
Article I of the GAU Charter specifies the geographical frontiers 
of the membership of the OAU, which includes the continental Mrican 
states, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa.3!! It was im-
portant to clarify the geographical limits of the OAU in order to 
distinguish it from the mainstream Pan-African movement which was 
diasporic in scope. From the formation of the OAU, one can discern 
28 See BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, THE AnDIS ABABA CHARTER-A COMMENTARY 13-25 (Anne 
Winslow ed., 1964). 
29 Charter of the Organization of African Unity, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 
18, at 62 [hereinafter OAU CHARTER). 
~o See BOUTROS-GHALI, supra note 28, at 13-25. 
~l U.N. CHARTER preamble, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY xix 
(Bruno Simma ed., 1994) [hereinafter U.N. CHARTER). 
~2 See OAU CHARTER, supra note 29, at art. VIII. 
~~ See id. at art. I, § 2. 
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a shift in the Pan-African movement from having a universal outlook 
to a regional worldview. 
The purposes and objectives of the GAU, as enumerated in Article 
II, are: 
a. to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; 
b. to co-ordinate and intensifY their co-operation and efforts 
to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; 
c. to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and 
independence; 
d. to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and 
e. to promote international co-operation, having due regard 
to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights.34 
To these ends, Article II calls upon the member states to coordi-
nate and harmonize their general policies. Priority areas identified for 
harmonization and coordination include: political and diplomatic co-
operation; economic cooperation, including transport and communi-
cation; educational and cultural cooperation; health, sanitation and 
nutritional cooperation; scientific and technical cooperation; and co-
operation for defense and security.35 Clearly, the areas requiring har-
monization through common efforts are diverse and encompass all 
facets of socio-economic and political life of the member states. The 
purposes of the GAU echo those of its progenitor, the Pan-African 
movement. 
The principles and norms that the OAU member states have 
pledged to observe scrupulously are enumerated in Article III and may 
be classified into three categories based on their teleological and 
philosophical underpinnings.36 Category One includes those princi-
ples aimed at safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
member states: Principle one, which recognizes the sovereign equality 
of all the member states; Principle two, which prohibits interference 
in the internal affairs of states; and Principle three, which reaffirms 
the member states' pledge to pay respect to the sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity of each state and its inalienable right to independent 
existence.37 Principle four, which immortalizes the principle of peace-
34 Id. at art. II, § 1. 
35 See id. at art. II, § 2. 
36 See id. at art. III. 
37 See OAU CHARTER, supra note 29, at art. III, §§ 1-3. 
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ful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or 
arbitration, may also fall into this category, since it is a principle 
aimed at settling disputes peacefully before they escalate into conflicts 
that may threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member 
states.38 
Category Two principles are aimed at the decolonization and 
emancipation of territories still under the yoke of colonialism. To this 
end, the member states affirm their "absolute dedication to the total 
emancipation of the Mrican territories which are still dependent."39 
Principle seven stands in a category of its own. It represents an 
attempt by the member states to create ideological uniformity in their 
foreign policy relations with non-member states. The stated policy of 
non-alignment provides a basis to govern the relations between the 
member states and the superpower blocs. This principle is under-
standable when analyzed in the context of the Cold War. Despite the 
member states' strongly professed adherence to non-alignment in the-
ory, it is still an open question as to whether they follow it in practice. 
Principle five may fit into Category One or in a category of its 
own, depending on how one interprets it.40 Condemnation of political 
assassination and subversive activities on the part of neighboring 
states,41 seen as a measure to protect the national political institutions 
from being undermined by extraterritorial forces, falls into Category 
One. However, the provision on assassination is a curious one. It may 
be viewed as a measure to protect and perpetuate the personalities 
occupying the highest offices in the land in addition to being a safe-
guard to the political institutions in the member states. 
This article focuses on dispute resolution. Therefore, these prin-
ciples will be examined in more detail later insofar as they affect the 
capacity of the OAD to resolve conflicts and settle disputes. In particu-
lar, the principles in Category One dealing with the protection of 
territorial integrity, sovereignty of member states, and non-interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of member states will be discussed. There 
is an inherent tension between the need to create a strong and effective 
organization and the desire to jealously guard the sovereignty of the 
member states. It is this tension that is at the heart of the ineffective-
ness of the OAD as a regional arbiter and stabilizer. 
38 See id. at art. Ill, § 4. 
39Id. at art. Ill, § 6. 
40 See id. at art. III, § 5. 
41 See id. 
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III. A GLIMPSE INTO THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE OAD 
In order to fully understand the role of the OAD in conflict 
resolution, one must examine the internal structure of the organiza-
tion.42 The OAD Charter creates four principal institutions to carry out 
its mandate: the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments; the 
Council of Ministers; the General Secretariat; and the Commission of 
Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration.43 
The Assembly of Heads of State and Governments is the OAD's 
"supreme organ," which has a general supervisory role over the other 
three components.44 It has the power to discuss matters of concern to 
Mrica with a view toward coordinating and harmonizing the general 
policy of the OAD. Additionally, it may review the structure, functions 
and acts of all the other organs and specialized agencies.45 The Assem-
bly is also entrusted with the judicial function of interpreting the 
Charter.46 
The Assembly is composed of heads of state or their accredited 
representatives. The Charter requires an annual general meeting for 
the Assembly and allows for an extraordinary session at the request of 
any member state with the approval of a two-thirds majorityY 
According to the OAD Charter, the Council of Ministers consists 
of foreign or other ministers as designated by the governments of 
member states.48 The role of the Council is to prepare conferences of 
the Assembly, implement the decisions of the Assembly, and coordinate 
inter-Mrican cooperation in accordance with the instructions of the 
Assembly.49 
An administrative Secretary-General, appointed by the Assembly, 
directs the affairs of the Secretariat.50 Assistant Secretaries-General may 
42 For a detailed analysis of the OAU Institutions, see James S. Bowen, Puwer and Autharity 
in the African Context: Why Somalia Did Not Have to Starve-The Organization of African Unity 
(OAll) As an Example of the Constitutive Process, 14 NAT'L BLACK LJ. 92, 101-08 (1995). 
430AU CHARTER, supra note 29, at art. VII. 
44 Id. at art. VIII. 
45Id. 
46 See id. at art. XXVII (posits that questions of interpretation of the Charter shall be 
determined by a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government). 
47Id. at art. IX. 
48 OAU CHARTER, supra note 29, at art. XII, § I. 
49 Evidently, the role of the Council of Ministers is adjunct to that of the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government. Indeed, Article XIII states that "The Council of Ministers shall be 
responsible to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government." OAU CHARTER, supra note 29, 
at art. XIII, § 1. 
50Id. at art. XVI. 
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also be appointed by the Assembly.51 The independence of the Secre-
tary-General and his or her staff is entrenched in the Charter. To avoid 
a conflict of interest, the Charter states that the Secretary-General and 
his or her staff are prohibited from receiving instructions from any 
external authority and are to refrain from actions which might inter-
fere with their positions as international officials responsible only to 
the organization.52 Likewise, the Charter provides that the member 
states undertake to respect the exclusive character of the Secretary-
General and his or her staff and do not to attempt to influence them 
in the discharge of their responsibilities.53 
The Commission of Mediation, Arbitration and Conciliation will 
be discussed in further detail in the next section. At this point it is 
important to mention the OAD's voting process. Two-thirds of the total 
membership form the quorum of both the Assembly and the Council. 54 
Procedural and substantive matters in both the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government and the Council of Ministers are determined 
by a simple and a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the 
organization, respectively. These majority requirements are significant 
in that one can easily envision the OAD being paralyzed by lack of a 
quorum.55 
IV. REGIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
WITHIN THE OAD CONTEXT 
A. Mechanisms for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the OA U Charter: 
The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration 
The OAD Charter established the Commission of Mediation, Con-
ciliation and Arbitration as one of the principal institutions of the 
organization. Carefully detailed steps were outlined to elaborate on its 
composition, procedures and functions. The complexity of this Com-
mission emphasizes the seriousness with which the founders of the 
OAD valued dispute resolution by peaceful means.56 Indeed, Article 
51 [d. at art. XVII. 
52 [d. at art. XVIII, § 1. 
53 [d. at art. XVIII, § 2. 
54 See OAU CHARTER, supra note 29, at art. X, § 4, art. XN, § 3. 
55 Such paralysis of the Assembly took place when Morocco and its sympathizers boycotted 
an OAU summit meeting prompted by the official recognition of the Sahara Arab Democratic 
Republic (SADR) by the OAU. See J. Naldi, The Organization of African Unity and the Saharan 
Arab Denwcratic Republic. 26 J. AFR. L. 152. 152 (1982). 
56 See OAU CHARTER. supra note 29. at art. XIX. 
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XIX, which establishes the Commission, echoes the prohibition of the 
threat or use of force found in the United Nations Charter. 
The protocol for the Commission forms an integral part of the 
OAU Charter.57 The protocol consists of six parts and provides in 
elaborate detail the modes, procedures and types of disputes to be 
submitted for settlement.58 Part One of the protocol deals with the 
establishment and organization of the Commission. The Commission 
consists of twenty-one members elected by the Assembly from a list, 
prepared by the Secretary-General, of names of persons of recognized 
professional qualifications who have been nominated by the member 
states.59 Each member state is entitled to nominate two candidates, but 
no two members of the Commission may hail from the same state. 60 
Members of the Commission hold office for a term of five years 
and are eligible for re-election. Upon the expiration of their terms, 
members of the Commission remain in office until the election of a 
new Commission. The members of the Commission also shall complete 
any proceedings in which they are already engaged, even if their term 
of office has expired.61 
Article IV secures the tenure of office of the members of the 
Commission. They shall not be removed from office except by decision 
of the Assembly of Heads of State. A decision to remove must be made 
by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly on the grounds of inability to 
perform the functions of the office or proven misconduct. 62 
The Commission is headed by a president and two vice presidents 
who are elected by the Assembly from among the members of the 
Commission to serve for a period of five years without being eligibile 
for re-election. These three officers constitute the Bureati of the Com-
mission and are designated as full-time members of the Commission, 
while the rest of the Commissioners are part-time members.63 
Part Two of the protocol, entitled "General Provisions," sets out 
the procedure for dealing with disputes. The jurisdiction of the Com-
mission is restricted to disputes between member states. However, even 
57Id. 
58 See Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, refrrinted in 
BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 18, at 69-76 [hereinafter Protocol]. 
59 Protocol, supra note 58, at art. II. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at art. III, § 3. 
62 Id. at art. lV. 
63Id. at art. VI. 
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non-member states may submit disputes between themselves and mem-
ber states to the Commission for adjudication.64 
A dispute may be jointly referred to the Commission by the parties 
concerned, by a single party to the dispute, by the Council of Ministers, 
or by the Assembly.55 When a dispute has been referred to the Com-
mission, and one or more parties have refused to submit to the juris-
diction of the Commission, the Bureau refers the matter to the Council 
of Ministers for consideration.66 It is not clear what happens after 
referral to the Council, but the Charter seems to indicate that the 
Council of Ministers can make a recommendation which may be sub-
mitted to the Assembly for further approval. 67 However, it is doubtful 
whether the resolution, if passed by the Assembly, is legally enforce-
able. 68 
Article XIX establishes three alternative means of dispute settle-
ment: mediation, conciliation and arbitration. These methods do not 
differ in any significant manner from their application in international 
law.69 Among the three methods, the simplest and least formal is me-
diation. Once the parties agree to mediation, the president of the 
Commission appoints one or more members of the Commission, with 
the consent of the parties, to mediate the dispute. 7o Once appointed, 
the mediator endeavors to reconcile the views of the parties and makes 
written proposals to the parties as expeditiously as possible. The solu-
tion that the mediator proposes, if accepted by the parties, forms the 
basis of an arrangement between the parties.7! 
Part Four of the protocol elaborates on the procedure of concili-
ation. One or more of the parties to a dispute formally submits a 
request for conciliation to the Commission by means of a petition 
addressed to the president. If only one party petitions, the petitioner 
must show that prior written notice has been transmitted to the other 
64 See Protocol, supra note 58, at art. XI; T. O. EUAS, AFRICA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 170-71 (Richard Aki~ide ed., rev. 1988) (1972). 
65 Protocol, supra note 58, at art. XIII, § 1. 
66 Id. at art. XIII, § 2. 
67 See OAU CHARTER, supra note 29, at art. XIII. 
68 The Charter does not create any mechanism for enforcement of the decisions of the 
institutions of the OAU. See geTteraUy OAU CHARTER, supra note 29. 
69 See generaUy OAU CHARTER, supra note 29. For a general background on international 
dispute resolution, see Christine Chinkin & Romana Sadurska, The Anatomy of International 
Dispute Resolution, 7 OHIO ST.]. ON DISP. RESOL. 39 (1991); Dayle E. Spencer & Honggang Yang, 
Lessons from the Field of Intra-national Conflict Resolution, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1495 (1992). 
70 Protocol, supra note 58, at art. XX. 
71 Id. at art. XXI. 
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party. The petition shall include a summary explanation of the grounds 
of the dispute.72 Next, the president of the Commssion forms a board 
of conciliators, consisting of three persons appointed by the president 
from among the Commission and one appointee of each party. The 
president designates one of the members of the Commission as chair-
man of the board. During the nominations, all parties attempt to 
ensure that none of the members of the board are nationals of the 
same state. 73 
The duties of the board are to clarify the issues in contention and 
to broker an agreement between the parties upon mutually acceptable 
terms. The board has jurisdiction to consider all questions submitted 
to it and may undertake any inquiry or hear any person capable of 
giving any relevant information concerning the dispute. Each board 
determines its own procedures with the consent of the parties.74 
The parties have a right to be represented before the board by 
agents who also act as intermediaries between the board and the 
parties. If the parties wish, these agents may be assisted by counsel and 
other experts. The parties may request that all persons with relevant 
evidence appear before the board.75 Finally, at the close of the proceed-
ings, the board drafts a report stating either the terms of the agreement 
between the parties, if there is one, or that it has been impossible to 
come to a settlement.76 The report shall be submitted to the president 
of the Commission as soon as possible and shall be published only with 
consent of the parties.77 
The procedure for establishing an arbitral tribunal is spelled out 
in Part Five of the Commission protocol. Each party to the dispute 
designates an arbitrator from among the members of the Commission. 
The parties may only select persons who are legally qualified. The 
chairman of the tribunal is designated from among the members of 
the tribunal by the two arbitrators appointed by the parties. If the two 
arbitrators fail to agree on the choice of a chairman within one month, 
the Bureau itself shall designate one.78 
The president may, with the consent of the parties, appoint two 
additional members, who need not be members of the Commission, 
72 Id. at art. XXII. 
73 Id. at art. XXIII, § 3. 
74Id. at art. XXIV, § 3. 
75 Protocol, supra note 58, at art. XXV. 
76 Id. at art. XXVI, § 1. 
77 Id. at art. XXVI, § 2. 
78Id. at art. XXVII, § 1. 
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but who will have powers equal to the other members of the tribunaI.79 
To ensure objectivity and impartiality within the tribunal, the arbitra-
tors cannot share nationality with the parties, have the same territorial 
domicile as the parties, or have served previously as mediators or 
conciliators in the same dispute.8o 
Once parties to a dispute agree to go to arbitration, the resulting 
agreement shall be presumed to be a submission in good faith to the 
arbitral award. This provision strikingly echoes the international law 
principle of pacta sunt servanda.81 As evidence of such agreement, the 
parties shall create a compromis confirming the desire of the parties to 
seek arbitration and to accept the decision of the tribunal as legally 
binding. The compromis shall further specify the subject matter of the 
dispute and the seat of the tribunal. 82 The compromis may also specify 
the law to be applied and whether or not the parties agree to adjudicate 
ex aequo et bono. Additionally, the compromis may indicate the appoint-
ment of counsel to take part in the proceedings and the time limit 
within which the arbitrators shall give an award.8!! 
In a case where the compromis is silent on the law to be applied, 
the tribunal shall decide the dispute according to treaties concluded 
between the parties, international law, the OAU Charter, the Charter 
of the United Nations, and, with the consent of the parties, ex aequo et 
bono.84 The hearings are held in camera unless the arbitrators decide 
otherwise. A record of proceedings signed by the registrar and the 
arbitrators shall alone be authoritative of the proceedings. The arbitral 
award shall be in writing and shall state reasons for every point de-
cided.85 
Such elaborate machinery clearly demonstrates the desire of the 
OAU founders to settle conflicts and disputes by peaceful means 
through certain and formal procedure. Ironically, no member state has 
ever submitted a dispute for adjudication by the Commission. There-
fore, this machinery has never been tested. Indeed, the Commission 
is of phantom existence. Instead, the OAU and its member states have 
'1!J Id. at art. XXVII, § 2. 
80 Protocol, supra note 58, at art. XXVII, § 3. 
81 Id. at art. XXVIII; WERNER LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw: A CONCISE INTRO-
DUCTION 1 (2d ed. 1991) (defining pacta sunt sertanda to mean "agreements must be kept"). 
82 Protocol, supra note 58, at art. XXIX, § 1. 
83Id. at art. XXIX, § 2. 
84 [d. at art. XXX. 
85 Id. at art. XXXI. 
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resorted to ad hoc committees and "good offices" to resolve their 
conflicts, and thereby have ignored the existence of the Commission. 
At least one observer in the early years of the OAU attributed this 
anomaly to the infancy of the Commission, arguing that the Commis-
sion was of recent creation and needed time to evolve guidelines.86 
Others attributed the redundancy of the Commission to the suscepti-
bility of Mrican disputes to "friendly solutions. "87 However, time has 
proven otherwise. Thirty-six years after its creation, the Commission 
has yet to come out of its infancy. More often than not, Mrican disputes 
have been settled on the battlefield instead of at a round-table confer-
ence. Perhaps the greatest weakness that has prevented the emergence 
of the Commission as a viable vehicle for peaceful settlement of dis-
putes is its very nature-it can only be moved to action through the 
consent of the disputants. There is no machinery in place for the 
enforcement of its decisions; hence, disputants have hardly any incen-
tive to submit to the Commission's jurisdiction.88 
B. Other Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 
As previously mentioned, the OAU has preferred to use "good 
offices" and ad hoc committees to deal with conflicts rather than the 
formal machinery provided by the Commission of Mediation, Concili-
ation and Arbitration. Perhaps less formal procedures are more at-
tuned to the fluidity and rapidity of Mrican conflicts, which tend to 
defy overly legalistic and time-consuming formal solutions.89 It is no 
coincidence that several conflicts and disputes in Mrica have been 
addressed through ad hoc arrangements.90 
Under the OAU's incumbent Secretary-General, Dr. Salim Ahmed 
Salim, a new mechanism, perhaps intended to replace the obsolete 
Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, has been cre-
ated. This mechanism, dubbed the "Organization of Mrican Unity's 
Central Organ for the prevention, management and resolution of 
conflicts," initially registered some success in dealing with the recent 
86 See BOUTRos-GHALI, supra note 28, at 45. 
87 See FELIX CHUKS OKOYE, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE NEW AFRICAN STATES 147 (1972). 
88 See OAU CHARTER, supra note 29, at art. XIX, XXII, XXVII, XXXI; Protocol, supra note 
58, at art. XIII. 
89 See Ibrahim J. Gassama, World Order in the Post-Cold War Era: the Relevance and the Role of 
the United Nations After Fifty Years, 20 BROOK. INT'L L. 255, 285 (1994). 
90 See Jane A. Meyer, Note, Collective Self-Defense and Regional Security: Necessary Exceptions to 
a Globalist Doctrine, 11 B.U.INT'L LJ. 391, 419 (1993). 
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Zairean crisis.91 Under the auspices of this new group, Togo hosted a 
summit in March, 1997 which brought the rebel forces of Laurent 
Kabila and the government of the dictator President Mobutu Sese Seko 
to the negotiating table.92 Plans also are underway to establish an early 
warning system to facilitate the investigation of potential conflict areas 
and allow for timely intervention.93 This new mechanism could be just 
another ad hoc arrangement, a specialized Commission envisioned 
under Article XXII (the most probable option), or an institution of 
the OAU established through an amendment to the OAU Charter (the 
most improbable option). 
V. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE OAU IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: CASE STUDIES 
This section sets forth case studies of conflicts in Africa in order 
to demonstrate the challenges that faced the OAU in each conflict and 
the OAU's response to those challenges. A thematic as well as a sub-
regional approach is adopted. In the Maghreb region, the Moroccan-
Algerian border conflict and the Western Sahara conflict are discussed. 
The Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya border conflict is the focus in the Horn 
of Africa. In West Africa, the Nigerian civil war is examined; in Central 
Africa the Congo crisis is discussed; and in Southern Africa, the South-
ern Rhodesian crisis is described. It is worthwhile, however, to attempt 
a characterization of these conflicts before embarking on case studies. 
A. Characterization of Conflicts and Case Studies 
Scholars have developed different ways of classifYing conflicts. 94 
T.O. Elias places post-colonial African conflicts into two categories: 
(a) those that may be regarded as inherited, in the sense that 
they emanate from the rights and obligations that devolved 
91 See Paul Ejime, Salim Says Zaire Needs Negotiated Transition, PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY, 
May 3. 1997 (visited Mar. 12. 1999) <http://search.nando.net!plweb-cgi/ ... OCentral%200r-
gan%20peace%29%3ATEXT>; Rigobert Munkeni-Lapess, Security Concerns Dog Proposed 
Mobutu-Kabila Meeting. PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY. Apr. 24, 1997 (visited Mar. 12. 1999) 
<http://search.nando.net!plweb-cgi/ ... OCentral %200rgan % 20peace % 29% 3ATEXT> . 
92 See Munkeni-Lapess. supra note 9l. 
93 See OAU to Set up Conflict Early Warning System. PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY. May 11.1997 
(visited Mar. 12. 1999) <http://search.nando.net/plweb-cgi/ ... C%3DDate%3C%3DI9970511 % 
20%20%20%20> . 
94 See Ted Robert Gurr. Theories of Political Violence and Revolution in the Third World. in 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA 153. 167-71 (Francis M. Deng & I. William Zartman eds .. 1991). 
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in the new States in the consequence of the application of 
state succession; and (b) those that are the results of post-in-
dependence alignments mainly in economic and technical 
spheres.95 
Oliver Furley categorizes post-colonial conflicts into internal or 
inter-state conflicts.96 
Inter-state conflicts are caused mainly by border disputes emanat-
ing from the legacy of colonialism.97 Mrican state boundaries can be 
traced to the Berlin Conference of 1885, at which the European impe-
rial powers, oblivious to the natural boundaries between the different 
nationalities, partitioned Mrica into spheres of influence.98 For exam-
ple, the Somali people were divided among Kenya, Somalia, and Ethio-
pia, while the Ewe were divided among Dahomey (now Benin), Togo, 
and Ghana.99 
Intra-state conflicts have a myriad of causes, ranging from ethnic 
animosity caused by the divide-and-rule tactics of the colonial regimes 
in Africa (such as the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda and Burundi) to 
historical differences between groupS.IOO Other conflicts are caused by 
disparities in the distribution of wealth within states. IOI Governance 
problems and human rights violations are other principal sources of 
conflicts in Mrica.102 
95 ELIAS, supra note 64, at 162. 
96 Oliver Furley, Introduction: Africa: The Habit of Conflict, in CONFLICT IN AFRICA 1,9 (Oliver 
Furleyed., 1995). 
97 For a thorough discussion of the phenomenon of Mrican colonial boundaries, see IAN 
BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES: A LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC ENCYCLOPAEDIA 3-12 (1979). 
98 See Mutua, supra note 16, at 1127 n.42. 
99 See ZDENEK CERVENKA, THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND ITS CHARTER 92 
(1969); WORONOFF, supra note 10, at 346-47. 
100 See Neil Weiner, Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda and BUTUnd~ May 1,1994 (visited on Mar. 12, 
1999) <http://www.backgroundbriefing.com>. For instance, the simmering internal conflict in 
Chad is basically an ethnic conflict between the Muslim Arabs in the North and Black Africans 
in the South who are either Christians or profess African traditional religions. For a detailed 
discussion of this North-South divide, see Rene Lemarchand, Chad: The Misadventures of the 
North-South Dialectic, 29AFR. STUD. REv. 27, 28-31 (1986). 
101 See M. Louise Pirouet, The Effects of Conflict, I: Human JUghts and Refugees, in CONFLICT 
IN AFRICA, supra note 96, at 275,281-82. 
102For a discussion of the process of class formation and ensuing governance conflict in one 
African nation, see Emmit B. Evans Jr., Sources of Socia-Political Instability in an African State: The 
Case of Kenya's Educated Unempluyed, 20 AFR. STUD. REv. 52 (1977). Regarding recent human 
rights crises, see Edward Barnes, Into the Heart of Darkness, TIME, Jan. 25, 1999, at 46-47 
(describing Sierra Leone rebel offensive and resulting human rights violations). 
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Other intra-state conflicts are closely linked with the nature of the 
nation-state in Mrica-the so-called crisis of the nation-state. The Mri-
can nation-state is characterized by a monopolization of state power 
and wealth by one elite faction. This engenders conflict because, when 
excluded elite groups attempt to wrestle power from the group con-
trolling the state apparatus and national wealth, the ruling elite de-
fends the status quo at all costs. 103 For example, the Ethiopian civil war 
has been viewed as a series of reactions by other elite groups (mainly 
the Tigre and the Oromo) who were excluded from the spoils of state 
power by the Amahara ruling clasS.104 Other conflicts are caused by 
special problems, such as the destabilization policies of the former 
apartheid regime in South Mrica. 105 
The characterization of conflicts as intra-state or inter-state is 
arbitrary because of the complexity and interconnectedness of causes 
and consequences. More often than not, intra-state conflicts have ex-
tra-territorial effects, and inter-state conflicts certainly have intra-state 
repercussions. Furthermore, although FurIey's above categorization is 
useful as an aid to analysis, it is too broad. I would argue that it is 
possible to subdivide Mrican conflicts into seven narrower categories: 
1) inter-state conflicts arising from the colonial legacy of artificial bor-
ders; 2) conflicts emanating from colonial state succession; 3) conflicts 
involving illegitimate and racist regimes resulting from delayed de colo-
nization; 4) internal conflicts resulting from secessionist movements; 
5) internal conflicts resulting from challenges to the legitimacy of the 
authority in power; 6) conflicts involving external intervention; and 
7) conflicts with strong religious or ethnic underpinnings. l06 
103 See generally David Throup, The Colonial Legacy, in CONFLICT IN AFRICA, supra note 96, 
at 237, 237-74. 
\04 See generally PATRICK GILKES, THE DYING LION: FEUDAUSM AND MODERNIZATION IN 
ETHIOPIA 175-227 (1975). 
105 See generally Tom Lodge, Perspectives on Conflid Resolution in South Africa, in CONFUCT 
RESOLUTION IN AFRICA, supra note 94, at 115, 115-49 (discussing South Africa's political culture 
and potential transfer of power). 
I06Ellen Frey-Wouters identifies five categories. See Ellen Frey-Wouters, The Relevance of 
Regional Arrangements to Internal Conflids in the Developing World, in LAw AND CIVIL WAR IN THE 
MODERN WORLD 458, 466-73 Uohn Norton Moore ed., 1974). The present writer deviates from 
this classification by discerning seven categories, borrowing from Frey-Wouters' two categories on 
conflicts involving external intervention and one involving illegitimate and racist regimes. See id. 
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1. Inter-State Conflicts Arising from the Colonial Legacy of 
Artificial Borders 
a. The Algerian-Moroccan Border Conflict 
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The Algerian-Moroccan border conflict was the first test case on 
the capacity of the infant OAU to resolve conflicts. It is also a micro-
cosm of other border conflicts bedeviling the continent in that it 
illustrates the legacy of colonialism.107 The actual conflict erupted in 
July, 1962, when Moroccan troops tried to occupy various areas in the 
disputed frontier zone after the referendum that ushered in Algeria's 
independence. Morocco claimed that this area formed an integral part 
of its kingdom. lOB The Algerian government responded through mili-
tary force. I09 
The genesis of the problem can be traced back much earlier, to 
the beginning of French colonial rule in the Maghreb region. Morocco 
had existed as a distinct entity for more than a thousand years when 
the French conquered and occupied Algeria in 1930.110 To serve their 
own interests, the French avoided demarcating the boundary between 
Morocco and Algeria; indeed, France signed several treaties with Mo-
rocco without attempting to fix a boundary between Morocco and 
Algeria. lll This boundary issue and the Islamic concept of umma, 
denoting a nation as a community of believers, as distinguished from 
the Western concept of a nation with an ascertainable territorial entity, 
encouraged Morocco to harbor irredentist ambitions. ll2 Thus, when 
the French were forced by the Algerian war of liberation to withdraw 
from Algeria in 1962, the seeds of conflict had been germinating for 
a long time.l1!l 
During that war of liberation, Morocco decided to submit the 
border dispute to the United Nations Security Council, while Algeria, 
favoring an Mrican solution, took the dispute to the OAU. Morocco's 
107 For a more detailed history of French colonial involvement, see Alf Andrew Heggoy, 
Colonial Origins oj the Algerian-Moroccan Brmler Conflict oj October 1963, 13 AFR. STUD. REv. 17, 
17-22 (1970). 
108 See FRANK E. TROUT, MOROCCO'S SAHARAN FRONTIERS 426 (1969). 
109 See ill. 
110 See I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN NORTHERN AFRICA 19 (1963). 
111 See WORONOFF, supra note 10, at 336. 
112 See HA. Amankwah, International Law, Dispute Settlement, and Regional Organizations in 
the African Setting, in THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAw: AN INTRODUCTION 
197,202 (Frederick E. Snyder & Surakiart Sathirathai eds., 1987). 
113 See ill. at 202. 
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allies within the Security Council similarly persuaded it to seek an 
Mrican solution first. 114 Hence, Emperor Haile Selasie of Ethiopia and 
President Modibo Keita of Mali organized a meeting in Bamako to 
negotiate a cease-fire.115 Although the negotiated armistice was short-
lived, the meeting produced the famous Bamako Communique which 
consisted of a five-point plan with the following goals: 
1. the immediate end of hostilities ... ; 
2. the creation of a committee composed of Algerian, Moroc-
can, Ethiopian and Malian military officers which would de-
fine a demilitarized zone; 
3. the supervision of security and military neutrality in the 
demilitarized zone by Ethiopian and Malian observers; 
4. the request for an extraordinary meeting of the OAU 
Council of Ministers, for the purpose of creating a committee 
of arbitration to effect a definitive solution of the Algerian-
Moroccan dispute and 
5. the cessation of hostile propaganda attacks ... ,u6 
The requested extraordinary meeting of the OAU Council of 
Ministers was convened in Addis Ababa in November, 1963 to discuss 
the conflict.1l7 A summary of the arguments that delegates of both 
parties submitted to the Council of Ministers reveals how diametrically 
opposed both sides were and the difficult position in which the OAU 
found itself. Morocco submitted the following arguments: 1) Morocco 
had a historic claim to the area; 2) various treaties concluded with 
France and the treaty with the Algerian provisional government in 
1961 supported its position; and that 3) since the French left the fron-
tier between Morocco and Algeria undefined, Algeria should honor 
the 1961 agreement.118 Algeria replied with the following arguments: 
1) the 1961 agreement was signed under force majeure and, therefore, 
would not be honored; 2) Morocco's expansionism was contrary to the 
spirit of the OAU Charter and, if allowed, could destroy the OAU; and, 
3) "to impose unilaterally the least revision of the Algerian-Moroccan 
114 See OKOYE, sufrra note 87, at 148. 
115 See Amankwah, sUfrra note 112, at 202. 
116 [d. 
117 See TROUT, sufrra note 108, at 427-28. 
118 See S. O. AGBI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND AFRICAN DIPLOMACY, 1963-
1979, at 9 (1986). 
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borders is without doubt to create a precedent or an unfortunate 
jurisprudence for the future of many Mrican states .... "119 
Clearly, the Council of Ministers was in a quandary; both parties 
had equally strong but irreconcilable positions. Characteristically, the 
Council avoided dealing with the substantive issues raised by both 
parties and instead appointed an ad hoc committee composed of the 
Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Tanzania, 
designed to created the "definitive settlement of the Algerian-Moroc-
can border dispute."12o The parties attended several commission meet-
ings, none of which appears to have decisively changed the status 
quO. 121 However, the two governments announced on February 20, 
1964, that they had signed an agreement and resumed diplomatic ties. 
A series of negotiations culminated in a temporary treaty of coopera-
tion and solidarity between the two countries.122 
It would be erroneous to credit the end of this conflict solely to 
OAD efforts. There is no doubt that the ad hoc committee facilitated 
the negotiations that preceded the settlement. The final settlement of 
the conflict, however, appears to have originated from the protagonists. 
Be that as it may, a conflict that exhibited signs of future catastrophe 
in a fragile continent had been successfully resolved. 
b. The Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya Border Conflict 
The Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya border conflict also has its roots in 
Mrica's colonial past. The plight of the Somalis is perhaps the best 
example of the arbitrary manner in which the European colonial 
powers went about dividing Mrica. 12!1While it is impossible to give here 
a full account of the history of the establishment of the colonial state 
in the Horn of Mrica,124 suffice it to say that the Somali people were 
subdivided into the four countries that constitute the Horn out of 
convenience.125 The Somali people are spread across the borders of 
1191d. at 9-lO. 
12°Amankwah, supra note 112, at 203. 
121 SeeWORONOFF, supra note 10, at 340-42. 
122 See id. at 343-44. The agreement was dissolved in April, 1964, and disputes continued for 
some time thereafter. See id. 
123 See, e.g., Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, The lmplicatiuns of Crises and Cunflict in the upper Nile 
Valley, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA, supra note 94, at 96, 96-lO2 (setting out historical 
roots of conflict with Ethiopia over territory). 
124For a more detailed discussion, however, read Michael Chege, Cunflict in the Hum of 
Africa, in AFRICA: PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE & DEVELOPMENT 87-100 (Emmanuel Hansen ed., 
1987) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE]. 
125These four nations are Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti. 
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Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. 126 The protests by the Somalis against 
this balkanization went unheeded; despite consistent Somali objec-
tions, British colonial authorities signed treaties with Ethiopia that 
transferred the Ogaden region occupied by the Somalis to Ethiopia. 127 
In addition, when the British granted independence to Kenya in 1963, 
they ignored the wishes of the predominantly Somali inhabitants of 
the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya to be unified with 
Somalia. 128 
Consequently, the irredentist stance taken by Somalia immediately 
after independence in 1960 was neither unexpected nor surprising. 129 
The Western Somalia Liberation Front, acting in close collaboration 
with the Somali government, called for self-determination for Somalis 
in Kenya and Ethiopia. 130 The determination of the Somali to gain 
Somalian aUlonomy, and their resentment of what they viewed as 
British betrayal, was registered in March, 1963, when Somalia broke 
off diplomatic relations with Britain.131 Tensions reached their peak in 
1964, when Somali nationals raided Ethiopian and Kenyan army and 
police posts. 1!l2 Somalia's earlier attempt to introduce the dispute for 
discussion at the OAU inaugural conference met stiff opposition from 
Ethiopia, and the matter was shelved.133 
However, due to continued incitement of the Ethiopian Somali 
population, Ethiopia requested an extraordinary session of the Coun-
cil of Ministers to discuss what Ethiopia considered "aggression" by 
Somalia. 134 The Somali government also requested that the dispute be 
included on the agenda of the extraordinary session. Both disputants 
were asked to present their cases before the Council of Ministers when 
it met on February 12, 1964.135 Regrettably, the resolution passed by 
the Council did not address the substance of the problem, but simply 
implored both sides to settle their differences amicably in accordance 
126 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Naticmal Que5ticm and the Crisis of Instability in Africa, in PERSPEC-
TIVES ON PEACE, supra note 124, at 55, 65. 
127 See TOM J. FAKER, WAR CLOUDS ON THE HORN OF AFRICA: A CRISIS FOR DETENTE 68-69 
(1976). 
128 See id. at 77-79. 
129 See ZARTMAN, supra note 110, at 173. 
ISO See Nzongola-Ntalaja, supra note 126, at 66. 
lSI See I. M. LEWIS, THE MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALILAND: FROM NATION TO STATE 192-93 
(1965). 
IS2 See Amankwah, supra note 112, at 204; Chege, supra note 124, at 90. 
m See LEWIS, supra note 131, at 197-99. 
IS4 Amankwah, supra note 112, at 204. 
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with the DAU Charter.136 Unfortunately, the next extraordinary Coun-
cil of Ministers meeting that took place in Lagos, Nigeria did not 
address the heart of the dispute either.137 
Somalia emphasized the importance of self-determination for the 
Somali populations in the disputed region, while Ethiopia warned of 
the danger of attempting to revise Mrica's borders. 138 The words of the 
Ethiopian delegate capture the dilemma that the arbitrary colonial 
borders placed on the DAU: "If we seek to redraw the map of Africa 
on the basis of so-called tribal or racial or ethnic affinities, we will have 
cast ourselves adrift on a wild sea in a voyage that can only end in 
disaster. "139 Predictably, the Somalian proposal was rejected, and both 
sides were asked to respect each others' territorial integrity. The Coun-
cil of Ministers further ordered the continuation of the previously 
agreed upon cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities.l4o Ethiopia had 
succeeded in preying on Mrica's worst fears by pointing out what could 
occur if the Council of Ministers attempted to revise the boundaries 
of the Mrican countries. 
The cease-fire was successful for a short time. A new government 
took power in Somalia and vowed to follow the expansionist policies 
of the previous government.141 However, immediate danger was averted 
when, through the diplomatic efforts of President Kenneth Kaunda of 
Zambia, the President of Kenya and the Prime Minister of Somalia 
signed a memorandum of understanding to end the tensions between 
their two countries.142 The memorandum cooled tensions between 
Ethiopia and Somalia for a while as well.143 
Unfortunately, a new government led by Siad Barre took power in 
Somalia. l44 Although Barre did not embark on an expansionist policy 
immediately, at the twenty-first meeting of the Council of Ministers in 
Addis Ababa in May, 1973, Somalia unsuccessfully attempted to per-
suade the summit to formally agree that a dispute existed between 
Ethiopia and Somalia. That marked the beginning of a succession of 
events that culminated in a devastating war between Ethiopia and 
136 See Amankwah, supra note 112, at 204. 
m See AGBI, supra note 118, at 27-28. 
138 See id. at 28. 
159/d. at 28. 
140 See WORONOFF, supra note 10, at 351. 
141 See FAKER, supra note 127, at 89. 
142 See id. at 90. 
143 See Chege, supra note 124, at 93. 
144 See Christopher Clapham, The Hum of Africa: A Cunflict Zone, in CONFUCT IN AFRICA, 
supra note 96, at 72, 76. 
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Somalia from 1977-78.145 Participation by the superpowers on both 
political divides escalated the war.146 Efforts by an OAU ad hoc com-
mittee to settle the conflict were ineffective. 147 However, due to So-
malia's denial of arms and facilities to local guerrillas, this conflict was 
scaled down considerably.148 
2. Conflicts Emanating from Colonial State Succession: The 
Western Sahara Conflict 
No other dispute has shaken the very foundations of the OAU like 
the protracted Western Sahara conflict. 149 Following the admission of 
the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) 150 to the OAU, a Moroc-
can-instigated boycott brought the activities of the OAU to a halt when 
the riineteenth summit conference, which was to be held in Tripoli, 
Libya, failed to take place due to the lack of a quorum. 151 
This conflict can be put into perspective by looking at its history. 
Spain acquired the territory of what is now Western Sahara between 
1884 and 1934.152 The Kingdom of Morocco, which pre-existed the 
presence of Spain in the area, protested the occupation of this territory 
by Spain and claimed sovereignty over it. 153 Mauritania, the southern 
neighbor, also claimed this territory.154 
Under pressure from these expansionist regional states, and de-
sirous of keeping its colonial acquisition, Spain declared Western Sa-
hara as one of its provinces in 1958. Spain's decision created furor and 
opposition within the United Nations General Assembly, as well as from 
Morocco and Mauritania. 155 Mter prompting by the United Nations 
145 See id. at 78. 
]46 See id. 
147 See Amankwah, supra note 112, at 204. 
148 See Chege, supra note 124, at 93-95. 
]49 Other than illustrating the inuicacies of conflict resolution in Mrica, the Western Sahara 
conflict is also a study in the problem of state succession, imperatives of state membership in the 
OAU, and the legal problem of attributing statehood to a territorial entity. For details, see Naldi, 
supra note 55, at 152. 
]50 See JEREMY HARDING. THE FATE OF AFRICA: OOAL BY FIRE 105 (1993). 
]5] See Naldi. supra note 55. at 152. 
]52 See Azzedine Layachi, The OAU and Western Sahara: A Case Study. in THE OAU AFTER 
THIRTY YEARS. supra note 25. at 27. 29. 
]53 See id. 
]54 See Radha Krishna Ramphul. The Role of International and Regional Organizations in the 
Peaceful Seulement of Internal Disputes (With SPecial Emphasis on the Organization of African Unity). 
13 GA.]. INT'L & COMPo L. 371, 382 (1983). 
]55 See Layachi, supra note 152, at 29-30. 
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Security Council, Spain agreed to hold a referendum to determine 
whether the Sahawi, the inhabitants of the contested territory, pre-
ferred to rule themselves, to join Morocco or Mauritania, or to remain 
under the protection of Spain. 156 
Spain's attempts to carry out the demands for a referendum from 
the United Nations General Assembly in 1965157 and the OAU in 
1972,158 however, were preempted when, largely due to Morocco's and 
Mauritania's diplomatic efforts, the General Assembly adopted a reso-
lution seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of 
Justice. 159 The Court was asked to answer the following questions: 
1. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet EI Hamra) at 
the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no 
one (terra nullis)? 
If the answer to the first question is in the negative, 
2. What were the legal ties between this territory and the 
Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?l60 
The. Court found that some "legal ties of allegiance" existed be-
tween the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the 
territory of Western Sahara, and that equally legal ties existed be-
tween the Mauritanian entity and the territory of Western Sahara. 
The Court held, however, that the evidence presented did not 
establish any ties of sovereignty between the territory of Western 
Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. The 
Court, therefore, found nothing preventing the General Assembly 
from implementing "the principle of self-determin~tion through 
the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the 
Territory. "161 
Although the decision of the International Court of Justice un-
equivocally rejected any claim by Morocco or Mauritania to Western 
Sahara, the intransigent King Hassan II of Morocco interpreted the 
Court's decision in his favor and proceeded to organize the "Green 
March," an invasion of Western Sahara by Moroccan troops and civil-
156See id. at 29; Ramphul, supra note 154, at 382; Yahia H. Zoubir, The Western Sahara 
Conflict: A Case Study in Failure of Prenegotiation and Prolongation of Conflict, 26 CAL. W. INT'L 
LJ., 173, 175 (1996). 
157 See Zoubir, supra note 156, at 175 n.7. 
158 See id. at 175 n.8. 
159 See id. at 175 n.9. 
160 See id. at 176. 
1611d. (quoting Advisory Opinion, Western Sahara, 1975 I.CJ. 68 (Oct. 16». 
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ians. 162 Problems at home, coupled with pressure from the United 
States, forced Spain, under the terms of the Madrid Accords, to cede 
Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. 163 
Algeria, the main backer of the Sahrawi nationalist movement 
(POLISARIO) ,164 which had been waging a guerilla war against Span-
ish occupation, was outraged by the turn of events.165 With Algeria's 
support, POLISARIO shifted its attacks to Morocco and Mauritania 
until the latter withdrew from the region due to internal problems~ 166 
The tensions had reached their peak in 1976, when POLISARIO pro-
claimed the Western Sahara an independent state under the name 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).167 
Two Council of Ministers meetings, held in February and July, 
1976 in Addis Ababa and Mauritius, Mauritania, respectively, affirmed 
the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination, but did not 
develop concrete proposals on how to end the conflict. l68 Between 
1976 and 1978, attempts to call an extraordinary meeting of the OAU 
failed due to lack of a quorum.169 Subsequently, a summit took place 
in Khartoum, Sudan, where an ad hoc committee consisting of Mali, 
Guinea, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast and Tanzania was formed to look into 
the conflict.170 At the 1979 Monrovia conference, the OAU passed a 
resolution calling for a cease-fire and the holding of a free referendum 
for the inhabitants of Western Sahara in order to exercise their right 
of self-determination. l7l Meanwhile, the United Nations General As-
sembly recognized POLISARIO as the legitimate representative of the 
Sahrawi people.172 
At the Nairobi summit in 1981, the ad hoc committee proposed 
a three-point plan for the resolution of the conflict which contained 
the following provisions: (1) cease-fire and direct negotiations between 
the parties; (2) establishment of a multinational peace-keeping force 
162 See Layachi, supra note 152, at 31; see also TONY HODGES, WESTERN SAHARA: THE ROOTS 
OF A DESERT WAR 211 (1983). 
16SSee Zoubir, supra note 156, at 177 n.16. 
164 See A. Peter Mutharika, The Role of the United Nations Security Council in African Peace 
Management: Sume Proposals, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 537, 549 (1996). 
165 See HARDING, supra note 150, at 103--05. 
166 See Ramphul, supra note 154, at 383. 
167 See HARDING, supra note 150, at 105; Layachi, supra note 152, at 32. 
168 See Layachi, supra note 152, at 32. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. at 32-33. 
171 See Zoubir, supra note 156, at 183-84 n.162. 
172 See id. at 184. 
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and an interim administration; and (3) a referendum organized by the 
OAU and the United Nations. 173 However, the plan was never effectu-
ated because the Implementation Committee appointed to succeed the 
ad hoc committee failed to bring the parties to a negotiating table. I74 
In February, 1982, events took a new turn when, in a Council of 
Ministers' meeting, the OAU Secretary-General, Edem Kocljo, admit-
ted the SADR to the OAU's membership.175 Among other problems, 
this decision caused a crisis which led to the cancellation of the OAU 
Tripoli summit.176 By 1984, Morocco completed the construction of a 
wall surrounding what it termed the "useful triangle."177 POLISARIO, 
in turn, planned its most ambitious attack, "the Maghreb offensive," 
on Morocco which proved to Moroco that the wall was ineffective.178 
However, by 1988 circumstances seemed to change and primarily 
economic internal problems in Morocco and Algeria forced the two to 
resume diplomatic ties. 179 Attempts at direct negotiations between Mo-
rocco and POLISARIO were also made. The establishment of United 
Arab Maghreb (UAM), an economic grouping in the region, further 
explains the thawing of the relationship between Morocco and Alge-
ria. 180 
At this point, the arena of efforts to resolve this conflict shifted 
from the OAU to the United Nations. Mter a series of initiatives, the 
Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the OAU worked out a 
comprehensive plan for a referendum to be held towards the end of 
1990 or at the beginning of 1991.181 This plan was approved by both the 
General Assembly and the Security Council. Subsequently, the United 
Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), 
consisting of a multinational force and military observers to oyersee 
173 See id. at 184-85. 
174 See Layachi, supra note 152, at 33-34. 
175 See id. at 34. 
176 See id. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 See Layachi, supra note 152, at 34-45; see also George Joffe, The Cunflict in the Western 
Sahara, in CONFLICT IN AFRICA, supra note 96, at 110, 113 (economic cost of occupation became 
so high that Morocco was forced to negotiate while internal unrest in Algeria shifted the focus 
of the Algerian government from effectively supporting SADR to resolving problems at home). 
180 See Layachi, supra note 152, at 35. 
181 See U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFO., THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS 
PEACE-KEEPING 271-72 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter BLUE HELMETS]. 
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the implementation of the plan, was created with both parties in 
agreement.182 
Unfortunately, a key obstacle to the implementation of the plan 
emerged-POLISARIO and Morocco could not agree on the formula 
of identifYing the true inhabitants of Western Sahara. While PO-
LISARIO produced a list of 74,000 people based on a 1974 census by 
Spain, Morocco provided a roll of 200,000 people claiming to be 
Sahrawi.183 Due to this fundamental disagreement, the United Nations 
referendum failed to take place, and Morocco occupies Western Sa-
hara to this day.l84 
This is one of the conflicts in Mrica that cries out for resolution. 
The Security Council needs to develop a formula to determine the 
inhabitants of Western Sahara so that the long-overdue referendum 
can take place and the Sahrawi can live in peace again. Any objective 
observer would agree that taking the 1974 census as a point of depar-
ture in determining the original inhabitants is the most realistic for-
mula. Why the Security Council has delayed over this purely technical 
exercise is difficult to fathom. 
3. Conflicts Involving Illegitimate and Racist Regimes Resulting 
from Delayed Decolonization 
The Namibian and Zimbabwean struggles for independence and 
the South Mricans' struggle against the apartheid regime may be 
categorized as conflicts involving illegitimate and racist regimes result-
ing froni delayed decolonization. Unlike the other conflicts where the 
OAU had to act as a neutral arbiter, in these conflicts the OAU directly 
challenged the legitimacy of these nations' regimes. l85 The OAU 
viewed these regimes as unacceptable obnoxious vestiges of white su-
premacy from the colonial era. IS6 
The OAU initiatives to liquidate these illegal regimes were dou-
ble-pronged: a diplomatic war within the United Nations, and financial 
and military support to the Mrican liberation movements within these 
182 See itl. 
183 See Layachi, supra note 152, at 36. 
184 See Zoubir, supra note 156, at 211-13. 
185 See ESEDEBE, supra note 4, at 201-10. 
186 See CERVENKA, supra note 99, at 15-18 (OAU Resolutions on Decolonization and Apart-
heid). For a detailed discussion of the OAU diplomatic strategy against apartheid, its involvement 
in Rhodesia, and its support for liberation movements, see RENEKA GERTRUDIS SVBESMA-KNOL, 
THE STATUS OF OBSERVERS IN THE UNITED NATIONS 123-26, 129-31 (1981). 
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states.187 The Southern Rhodesia crisis illustrates this category of con-
flicts. 
Both the full potential and the inherent weaknesses of the OAU 
were revealed in the Rhodesian crisis. The crisis was triggered by the 
1964 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of the minority 
settler community in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), led by Ian Smith. This 
was not a sudden declaration; preparations had been going on for 
some time. 188 The settler community's quest for "independence" start-
ed immediately after the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland in March, 1963, when it formally requested indepen-dence 
from Britain. 189 The basis for the settler community's demand for 
independence was the 1961 class and racially-based constitution that 
had granted the country de facto self-government. Under this regime, 
187 Cervenka outlines six strategies adopted by the OAU Liberation Committee resolution to 
tackle colonialism: 
(I) to break off diplomatic and consular relations between all African States and 
the Governments of Portugal and South Africa; 
(2) to introduce an effective boycott of the foreign trade of Portugal and South 
Africa by: 
(a) prohibiting the import of goods from those two countries, 
(b) by closing African ports and airports to their ships and planes, 
(c) forbidding the planes of those two countries to overfly the territories of all 
African States; 
(3) to establish a CQ-Qrdinating Committee consisting of Algeria, Ethiopia, Guinea, 
Congo (Kinshasa), Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, the United Arab Republic and 
Uganda, with headquarters in Dar es Salaam, responsible for harmonizing the 
assistance for Mrican States and for managing the Special Fund to be set up for 
that purpose. The Committee was, in fact, supposed to become the directing centre 
of operations aimed at the overthrow of the white minority regimes of South Africa 
and Rhodesia, and at the total liberation of the African continent from the rem-
nants of colonialism ... ; 
(4) to establish a Special Fund to be raised by voluntary contributions of Member 
States, to be used for the necessary practical and financial aid to the various Mrican 
national liberation movements; 
(5) to receive on the territories of independent African States nationalists from 
liberation movements in order to give them training in all sectors and afford young 
people all assistance they need for their education and vocational training; 
(6) to promote in each State the transit of all material aid and the establishment 
of a body of volunteers in various fields, with a view to providing the various African 
national liberation movements with the assistance they need in various sectors. 
CERVENKA, supra note 99, at 16-17. 
188 See generally L. H. GANN, A HISTORY OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA: EARLY DAYS TO 1934 
(1965)(tracing colonial history of European contact with Rhodesia to 1934); PERCY F. HONE, 
SOUTHERN RHODESIA (Negro Universities Press 1969) (1909) (history of white settler community 
and original inhabitants of Rhodesia until early twentieth century). 
189 See WORONOFF, supra note 10, at 234-35; Layachi, supra note 152, at 30. 
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the propertied minority white settlers formed the ruling class and the 
poor black people were relegated to the underclass of society. 190 
The OAU did not hide its consternation at the events unfolding 
in Southern Rhodesia. The Second Ordinary Session of the Heads of 
State and Government meeting in Accra, Ghana in October, 1965, 
passed a resolution which recommended convening a broad-based 
constitutional conference that would "obtain universal adult suffrage, 
free elections, and then independence. "191 The OAU member states 
warned that they would oppose a unilateral declaration of indepen-
dence by the settlers and that they would support a liberation front in 
Rhodesia, with the goal of establishing a majority government in the 
coun try. 192 
The Assembly established a Committee of Five member states to 
examine the resolution and take appropriate measures for its effective 
implementation.193 However, this did not deter the white minority gov-
ernment from its efforts to gain independence, nor did it stop them 
from continuing to emasculate the black Mrican nationalist move-
ments. 194 Urban violence increased as black Mricans increasingly be-
came frustrated by oppression and discrimination which permeated 
every sector of government, while the right wing Rhodesian Front Party 
(RFP) gained further support from the white settler community.l95 The 
worst fears of the OAU were realized when Ian Smith made a flamboy-
ant unilateral declaration of independence in November, 1965.196 
Against this background, the OAU called an extraordinary meet-
ing of the Council of Ministers to discuss what they regarded as a 
"treasonable seizure of power by the racists of Southern Mrica. "197 The 
Council repeated the earlier calls made by the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government and called on the Mro-Asian group in th~ 
United Nations General Assembly to take appropriate actions to ensure 
that Britain adhered fully to the United Nations Resolutions on South-
ern Rhodesia. The Council also resolved that "if the United Kingdom 
does not crush the rebellion and restore law and order, and thereby 
190 See WORONOFF, supra note 10, at 234. 
191Id. at 238. 
192 See id. at 240. 
193 See id. 
194 See Stephen John Stedman, The End of the Zimbabwean Civil War, in STOPPING THE 
KILLING: How CIVIL WARS END 125, 128-29 (Roy Ucklider ed., 1993). 
195 See B. VULINDLELA MTSHALI, RHODESIA: BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT 117-21 (1967). 
196 See WORONOFF, supra note 10, at 240. 
197 AGBI, supra note 118, at 75. 
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prepare the way for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia by December 
15, 1965, the Member States of the OAU shall sever diplomatic rela-
tions on that date with the United Kingdom."198 The deadline arrived, 
but neither Britain nor Rhodesia heeded the OAU's ultimatum. The 
OAU membership was divided on what action to take next. Only nine 
states ultimately implemented the Council of Ministers' resolution. 199 
It is difficult to point to the OAU's contribution to the resolution 
of the Southern Rhodesia dispute. However, several issues are clear. 
The OAU's rhetoric and diplomatic pressure contributed to the isola-
tion and pariah status that the Ian Smith regime acquired. The Smith 
regime eventually realized that the war against the Mrican guerilla 
forces that had infiltrated the rural areas of the country was un-
winnable.20o There is, however, no denying that the liberation of 
Mozambique from Portuguese colonialism,201 the consequent ascen-
dancy of an independent Mrican government to power, and the sub-
sequent closure of the Beira rail link to the sea sealed the economic 
fate of landlocked Rhodesia and finally brought down the UDI govern-
ment.202 
The polarization of the membership of the OAU as to whether or 
not to break diplomatic ties with Great Britain reflected the weaknesses 
of a house divided from within. Some writers have questioned the legal 
validity of the Council of Ministers resolution, arguing that the Council 
has no power under the OAU Charter to make decisions binding on 
the member states and that the member states, therefore, had no 
obligation to implement the resolution.203 While this position seems 
legally correct, this argument does not absolve the OAU from its 
198 ELIAS, supra note 64, at 149. See generally GRAHAM C. KINLOCH, RACIAL CONFLICT IN 
RHODESIA: A SOCIO-HISTORICAL STUDY (1978). 
199 See ELIAS, supra note 64, at 149. Several factors explain the OAU's helplessness in dealing 
with Ian Smith's regime, and the division within the African ranks on what action to take. See id. 
at 155. A military confrontation between the African states and the Smith Regime was ruled 
out-the OAU was ill-equipped to cope with a conventional warfare with Rhodesia. See AGBI, 
supra note 118, at 79. Economic sanctions could not be strictly enforced because neighboring 
Malawi and Zambia were weak and their economies were so closely dependent on Rhodesia that 
they could ill-afford to impose sanctions on Rhodesia. See ELIAS, supra note 64, at 155. Finally, 
severence could not be unilaterally declared by the OAU because each member state had to settle 
whether and how it should take effect. See id. 
200 See Stedman, supra note 194, at 135-36. 
201 See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 181, at 321. 
202 See AGBI, supra note 118, at 85-86. For a thorough discussion of the Rhodesia crisis, see 
generally RALPH ZACKLIN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND RHODESIA: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 
(1974) (detailing source of conflict, international actions taken, and their impact on Rhodesia). 
203 See ELIAS, supra note 64, at 158-59. 
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responsibility of ensuring that its organs act in unison and make deci-
sions that member states are ready to implement. This is how to ensure 
the credibility of the OAU. 
4. Internal Conflicts Arising from Secessionist Movements 
A number of secessionist movements have sprung up in Mrica's 
post-independence history.204 They have been unsuccessful due to the 
fact that the OAU, as evidenced in its Charter, has opposed any at-
tempts at revising the borders which existed before independence.205 
This opposition stems from self-interest on the part of the Mrican rul-
ing elite and the genuine fear that revising Mrican borders will throw 
the continent into unprecedented instability.206 So far, only Eritrea has 
successfully seceded from Ethiopia.207 The Congo crisis and the Nige-
rian civil war illustrate this category of conflicts. 
a. The Congo Crisis 
The facts surrounding the Congo crisis are well-known.208 The 
Congo (later Zaire and now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) 
was granted independence by Belgium in 1960, with Joseph Kasavubu 
and Patrice Lumumba as president and prime minister, respectively.209 
The paternalistic colonial regime did little to prepare the Congo for 
independence and, therefore, any keen observer of the local situation 
could have foreseen an impending crisis. 210 
204 See Peter Lyon, The Ending of the Cold War in Africa, in CONFLICT IN AFRICA, supra note 
96, at 171, 171-72. The most memorable ones (discussed in the paragraphs that follow) are the 
Katanga and Biafra secessionist provinces of Congo and Nigeria, respectively. See id. 
205 See OAU CHARTER, supra note 29, at art. III, § 3. 
206 See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Eritrean Independence and African Constitutionalism: A 
Sudanese Perspective, in ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA: FROM CONFLICT TO COOPERATION 115 (Amare 
Tekle ed., 1994) (asserting that ill-defined borders present problems in Africa). 
207 See RUTH IYOB, THE ERITREAN STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE: DOMINATION, RESISTANCE, 
NATIONALISM, 1941-1993, at 1 (1995). 
208 See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 181, at 182-83. The Congo's first constitutional crisis was 
triggered by secessionist machinations in 1960. See id. The second crisis illustrates how the 
involvement of superpowers in a local conflict can complicate the situation and render its 
resolution daunting. See Yashpal Tandon, The Internationalization of the Civil War: Lessons from 
the Congo, Nigeria and Vietnam, in AFRICA IN WORLD AFFAIRS: THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS 63, 66--67 
(Ali A. Mazrui & Hasua H. Patel eds., 1973) [hereinafter AFRICA IN WORLD AFFAIRS]. See generaUy 
GEORGE MARTELLI, LEOPOLD TO LUMUMBA: A HISTORY OF THE BELGIAN CONGO, 1877-1960, at 
223-32 (1961) (background of political events from 1958-1960). 
209 See Rene Lemarchand, Footnote to History: Haw Lumumba Came to Pawer, 5 AFR. SPECIAL 
REp. 2, 13-15 (1960); see also MARTELLI, supra note 209, at 228-30. 
210 See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 181, at 175-76. 
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The crisis was triggered by the Belgian-sponsored secession of the 
mineral-rich Katanga province211 and the subsequen t assassination of 
the left-leaning Prime Minister Lumumba shortly after indepen-
dence.212 A moderate government led by Prime Minister Cyrille Aduola 
that emerged after the demise of Lumumba continued to confront the 
same problems.213 Political forces in the Congo were deeply divided 
despite the fact that by 1963, the secessionist forces led by Moise 
Tshombe had given up their bid for an independent state.214 
By March, 1963, the Congo was engulfed in another conflagration. 
Forces loyal to the deceased Prime Minister Lumumba regrouped un-
der the name of the Congolese National Liberation Committee (CNL) 
and launched an attack on the Aduola government from the neigh-
boring region of Brazzaville. 215 Moise Tshombe, with the support of the 
United States, Belgium, and other foreign mercenaries, launched his 
second bid for power.216 Due to the ensuing turmoil and the ineffec-
tiveness of his government to contain the situation, Aduola resigned 
and Tshombe was sworn in as Prime Minister in July, 1964.217 
This turn of events shocked the OAU. Tshombe was widely re-
garded as a traitor responsible for both the assassination of Prime 
Minister Lumumba and the escalation of the crisis by bringing in 
mercenaries from Rhodesia and South Mrica.218 It was hardly surpris-
ing that in October, 1964 the OAU member states threatened to walk 
out of a non-aligned movement summit in Cairo, Egypt, if Tshombe 
was allowed to attend.219 
The CNL forces reacted to Tshombe's ascent to power by launch-
ing an attack against government forces and capturing Stanleyville. 220 
A bloody civil war followed, pitting the superpowers against each other 
with the local protagonists as pawns. The support of Tshombe by the 
United States was countered with the backing of the CNL by the USSR 
and, to a lesser extent, China.221 
211 See id. at 177. 
212 See PHILLIPPA SCHUYLER, WHO KILLED THE CONGO? 243-47 (1962). 
213 See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 181, at 187-88. 
214 See id. at 188-96. 
215 See AGBI, supra note 118, at 41. 
216 See id. at 46--48. 
217 See id. at 41. 
218 See Ramphul, supra note 154, at 379. 
219 See Amankwah, supra note 112, at 205. 
220 See Ramphul, supra note 154, at 379. See generally SCHUYLER, supra note 212 (discussing 
Congo from its 1960 independence to 1962). 
221 See Ramphul, supra note 154, at 380. 
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Attempts by the OAU to resolve the conflict were unsuccessful.222 
An extraordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State' and Gov-
ernments met in September, 1964 to discuss the crisis. The Assembly 
appointed an ad hoc committee under the chairmanship of President 
Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya with a mandate to reconcile the warring 
parties and normalize relations between the Congo and its neighbors. 
The OAU also called for the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries, the 
formation of a caretaker government, and the holding of elections.223 
Calls by the OAU went unheeded, and initiatives by the Kenyatta 
Committee to reconcile the factions similarly failed. 224 In the continu-
ing civil war, the CNL forces appeared to gain an advan tage over 
Tshombe's forces. However, the famous Stanleyville operation effec-
tively caused the defeat of CNL forces and the emergence of Tshombe 
as the de factOj leader. 
Thus, the OAU displayed its impotence in yet another regional 
conflict. 225 However, the active involvement of extra-regional forces in 
this conflict absolves the OAU from any true indictment. Mter all, the 
endorsement of the OAU's call for the withdrawal of mercenaries by 
the United Nations Security Council went unheeded, and even the 
United Nations peacekeeping forces utterly failed to maintain peace.226 
Moise Tshombe later met his match in the person of Lieutenant 
Marshal Mobutu who, in a military coup, liquidated all of his oppo-
nents and assumed power.227 Mobutu presided over a corrupt govern-
ment, looting and plundering the resources of Zaire until recently, 
when rebel forces led by Laurent Kabila launched an offensive against 
Mobutu's regime. 228 Mobutu fled to exile in Morocco where he later 
died of prostate cancer.229 
222 See id. at 379-80; Amankwah, supra note 112, at 205. 
223 See Ramphul, supra note 154, at 380. 
224 See AGBI, supra note 118, at 50-52. 
225 The impotence of the OAU can partly be explained by lack of a unified approach at the 
beginning of the crisis with the radical states calling for intervention, the conservatives favoring 
noninterference in the internal affairs of the Congo, and moderate states desiring a middle way. 
For more details of the division of the Mrican camp by the Congo crisis, see Robert C. Good, 
Four African Views oJthe Congo Crisis, 6 AFR. REp. 3 (1961). 
226 See ARTHUR LEE BURNS & NINA HEATHCOTE, PEACE-KEEPING BY U.N. FORCES: FROM SUEZ 
TO THE CONGO 23-35 (1963). The intractability and complexity of the conflict is best illustrated 
by the fact that the then United Nations Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, lost his life in 
the Congo while on a peace mission. See Martyr-dum in the Congo, 6 AFR. REp. 2 (1961). 
227 See Kaye Whiteman, Mobutu Sese Seko: ThieJWIw Stole a Nation, THE GUARDIAN (London), 
Sept. 9, 1997, at 18. 
228 See Marguerite Michaels, The Bleeding Heart oj Africa, TIME, Mar. 15, 1999, at 62-63. 
229 See id. 
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b. The Nigerian Civil War 
The Nigerian civil war is a microcosm of internal contradictions 
within the African nation-state.230 Nigeria was a country of promise 
when it gained independence from the British in 1960.231 It was a 
showcase of liberal democratic experimentation.232 If what a newly 
independent country required was a democratic institutional base, 
Nigeria had just that-the federal constitution adopted after inde-
pendence contained an elaborate and generous bill of rights.233 Fur-
thermore, the principles of separation of powers and the rule of law 
were deeply ingrained in the federal constitutional order.234 
Yet, behind this constitutional facade of democracy and rule of 
law, seeds of civil strife were slowly germinating in the political arena; 
the tribal inclination of Nigeria's political parties illustrated the pre-
carious political balance that could be tilted at the slightest push.235 For 
example, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) was domi-
nated by the Igbo of Eastern Nigeria; the Northern People's Congress 
of Nigeria (NPC), by the Hausa people of Northern Nigeria; and the 
Action Group (AG), by the Yoruba of the Western region.2!l6 Nigeria's 
federal government was a quasi-national loose coalition of the Igbo 
and Hausa.237 Like other newly independent countries, allegiance to 
the tribe was the norm. Indeed, Nigeria was an amalgamation of tribes 
and not a nation per se.238 
In January, 1966, a military coup d'etat engineered by Igbo of-
ficers occurred, and Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa was assassinated.2!l9 
230 For a review of literature on the Nigerian civil war, see generally ZDENEK CERVENKA, THE 
NIGERIAN WAR, 1967-1970 (1971);jOHN DE ST.jORRE, THE NIGERian Civil War (1972); A. H. M. 
KIRK-GREENE, CRISIS AND CONFUCT IN NIGERIA: A DOCUMENTARY SOURCEBOOK, 1966-1970 (2 
vols.) (1971); Laurie S. Wiseberg, An Emerging Literature: Studies of the Nigerian Civil War, 18 AFR. 
STUD. REv. 117 (1975). 
251 See B. O. NWABUEZE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA 59-60 (1982). 
252 See generaUy OLUWOLE IDOWU ODUMOSU, THE NIGERIAN CONSTITUTION: HISTORY AND 
DEVELOPMENT (1963) (detailing "democratic" measures implemented while Nigeria was a colony, 
such as constitutions, limited voting power to Nigerians, and Nigeria's history oflocal self rule). 
235 See ELIAS, supra note 64, at 142-58 (describing "Fundamental Rights Provisions" con-
tained in the constitution). 
2!14 See T. O. ELIAS, NIGERIA: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAws AND CONSTITUTION 117-40 
(1967) (outlining structure of Nigerian Constitution). 
255 See JOHN J. STREMLAU, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 
1967-1970, at 4 (1977). 
236 See WILLIAM D. GRAY, THE NIGERIAN STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY, STATE CLASS AND 
POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE POST-COLONIAL ERA 31, 33 (1988). 
257 See id. at 27, 33. 
238 See WORONOFF, supra note 10, at 397; Arnankwah, supra note 112, at 206. 
239 See Arnankwah, supra note 112, at 206. 
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Later, Major General J.T. U. Aguiyi-lronsi, the Igbo leader of that coup, 
was executed in a counter-coup that catapulted General Gowon to 
power.240 This retaliation was unacceptable to the Igbo.241 The Military 
Governor of Eastern Nigeria, Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, 
declared the eastern region an independent state called Biafra. A 
bloody civil war ensued, pitting the federal government against the 
secessionist Biafra. The war claimed the lives of an estimated one 
million people.242 
What role did the OAU play in ending this unfortunate conflict? 
The OAU's capacity to resolve the Nigerian conflict was inhibited by 
the Charter's principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
member states, which prevented the OAU from getting fully involved 
in the crisis.243 Although the OAU was aware of its impotence, it did 
not want to appear to be doing nothing while a devastating civil war 
raged on in an Mrican country. Therefore, the crisis was discussed at 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government's summit meeting in 
Kinshasa, Zaire in September, 1967.244 The resolution passed at the end 
of the conference recognized that the conflict was Nigeria's internal 
affair, but placed the "services of the Assembly at the disposal of the 
Federal Government of Nigeria. "245 The conference also decided to 
send a consultative mission to the head of Nigeria's federal govern-
240 See id. 
241 The coup was followed by a slaughter of 19bos in the northern part of the country. See 
WORONOFF, supra note 10, at 401. This precipitated the ill-fated secession of the new republic of 
Biafra, on May 30, 1967. See GRAF, supra note 236, at 43. 
242 See Ramphul, supra note 154, at 381. 
243 See id. at 375-76. In reference to why the OAU failed to resolve the Nigerian crisis, Yashpal 
Tandon gives a summary of reasons that also explain the failure of the OAU in the other African 
intra-state conflicts. He writes: 
The O.A. U. framework collapsed because of the following factors: The first was that 
the OAU is, by design and constitution, an essentially conservative organization. It 
is anti-secessionist, anti-interventionist, and anti-border changes .... The second 
weakness of the OAU with reference to the Nigerian situation was its inability to 
enforce its decisions on Member States. The OAU could do nothing to prevent four 
Member States (Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast and Gabon) from recognizing Bia-
fra. The OAU has no sanctions, except those of collective disapprobation of default-
ing states, but even these the OAU was unprepared to invoke against the four 
states .... The third factor was the weakness of the OAU with respect to the outside 
world. Neither the OAU, nor any of its members, possesses the power to insulate 
African problems from extra-regional intervention. 
Tandon, supra note 208, at 68. 
244 See STREMLAU, supra note 235, at 93. 
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ment to "assure him of the Assembly's desire for the territorial integ-
rity, unity and peace of Nigeria. "246 
One wonders why the head of Nigeria's government needed this 
assurance from the OAU's Assembly. The Assembly was not fighting to 
dismember, nor was it violating the territorrial integrity of, Nigeria. In 
any case, why did the OAU send a mission to convey such an assurance 
when sending one head of state or dispatching a letter to the federal 
government would have served the purpose? Whatever logic lay behind 
the Assembly'S confused response to the Nigerian civil war, several 
issues are apparent. The tension between the desire to resolve the 
conflict and to remain faithful to the OAU Charter explains the As-
sembly's confused state of mind and unmitigated diplomatic blunder. 
However, by sending the mission to the federal government, the OAU 
did what it had all along pledged never to do-interfere in the internal 
affairs of a member state. Unfortunately, the OAU interfered not as an 
impartial umpire bent on genuinely mediating between the parties and 
ending the conflict, but as a supporter of the federal government. 
5. Internal Conflicts Resulting from Challenges to the Legitimacy of 
the Authority in Power 
Most of the previously examined cases are also manifestations of 
internal conflicts resulting from challenges to the legitimacy of power. 
Revisiting the Congo crisis case study illustrates this point. The Congo 
problem started as a conflict between the secessionist movement of 
Moise Tshombe and the government of Prime Minister Patrice Lu-
mumba and President Joseph Kasavubu.247 At that poin~, there was no 
regional body within which the Mrican states could launch an initia-
tive. The Mrican states, therefore, endorsed a United Nations peace-
keeping operation.248 However, when internal conflicts grew between 
Lumumba and Kasavubu, the Mrican states became deeply divided. 249 
The radical Casablanca group saw the ouster of Lumumba as an unac-
ceptable challenge to the legitimate authority of the Congo, while the 
conservative Monrovia group viewed any overt support to a specific 
group in the Congo as interference with the internal affairs of the 
246ld. 
247 See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 181, at 177. 
248 See Frey-Wouters, supra note 106, at 467 (discussing peace talks and humanitarian aspects 
becoming focus of DAU negotiations). 
249 See generally ALAN P. MERRIAM, CONGO BACKGROUND OF CONFLICT 253-67 (1961). Indeed, 
Lumumba and Joseph Kasavubu ousted each other. See id. 
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Congo. Because of this polarization, the Mrican states could not act in 
concert within the United Nations.250 
When Cyrille Aduola was installed as the successor to Lumumba 
in 1961, the situation seemed to improve.251 However, his government 
proved ineffective and the conflict was renewed when Tshombe, sup-
ported by the Americans, Belgians, and other foreign mercenaries, 
invaded from the Kivu and Kwilu provinces.252 
In reaction to this externally supported offensive, CNL forces loyal 
to the late Lumumba received direct support from the neighboring 
states of Congo (Brazzaville), Burundi, Uganda, and the Sudan, while 
the United Arab Republic (UAR), Algeria, and Ghana supplied the 
CNL with arms.253 A majority of African state leaders questioned the 
legitimacy of Tshombe's rule over the Congo and viewed him as a 
"nea-colonialist puppet. "254 
Other conflicts like the Sudanese civil war, the Rhodesian crisis, 
and the Namibian civil war similarly resulted from challenges to the 
legitimacy of the government in power, although they have other 
distinct characteristics mentioned elsewhere.255 
6. Conflicts Involving External Intervention 
A number of intra-state conflicts in Mrica have involved external 
intervention from nations either within or outside of Africa. Some 
Mrican countries in the early years of independence were accused of 
interfering in the internal conflicts of neighboring states.256 In fact, it 
was Ghana's alleged involvement in a coup in Togo that prompted the 
Addis Ababa conference to incorporate Article III, clause five into the 
OAU Charter.257 Probably the most famous unilateral intervention by 
an Mrican state into another was the 1979 Tanzanian intervention and 
ousting of dictator Idi Amin in Uganda.258 The OAU, through its 
250 See Frey-Wouters, supra note 106, at 467. 
251 See id. 
252 See id. 
25S See id. 
254 Leon Gordenker, The OA U and UN: Can They Live Together?, in AFRICA IN WORLD 
AFFAIRS, supra note 208, at 105, 115. 
255 See supra Part V A.3 and infra Part VA. 7. 
256 See Jonah, supra note 25, at 9. 
257 See CERVENKA, supra note 99, at 2 & n.4, 39. This author condemns political assassinations 
and subversive activities on the part of neighboring states or any other states. 
258 See. ANTONIO TANCA, FOREIGN ARMED INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CoNFLICTS 174 (1993) 
(Appendix, Case #20). 
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Liberation Committee indirectly gave aid to rebel groups who were 
fighting the last colonial regimes in the former Portugese colonies of 
Mozambique and Angola, as well as the racist white minority regimes 
in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Mrica.259 
A more recent unilateral involvement by African states in an in-
ternal conflict was the military support by Uganda, Angola, Burundi, 
and Rwanda of the rebels of Laurent Kabila in Zaire, which helped 
him gain the presidency.260 Mobutu's attempts to maintain power did 
not change the situation this time; he was eventually ousted by Kabila's 
forces. 261 
The Cold War manifested itself in Africa through superpower 
intervention in Mrican internal conflicts.262 External support of the 
Stanleyville operation and the Russian and Chinese involvement in the 
Congo crisis have already been discussed. The Angolan civil war was 
likewise sustained by Cuban and Russian support of the incumbent 
government and the sponsorship of the rebel movement by the former 
South African government and the United States.263 This article has 
already described the United States and Russian involvement in the 
conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia. France also has unilaterally 
intervened in its former colonies numerous times to save incumbent 
governments threatened by civil war or mutiny.264 
7. Conflicts with Strong Religious and Ethnic Underpinnings 
The Hutu-Tutsi conflict,within Rwanda and Burundi is an exam-
ple of an ethnic conflict exacerbated by the colonial divide-and-rule 
policy of playing ethnic groups against each other. 265 Another example 
259 See SYBESMA-KNOL, supra note 186, at 130-3l. 
260 See Michaels, supra note 228, at 62. See generally Whiteman, supra note 227. 
261 The intervention by ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as the involvement of 
the great lakes regional states in the Burundi conflict, will not be discussed here due to space 
limitations, but they are other instances of external involvement. For a study of the Liberian crisis 
see generally REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRI-
SIS (M. Weller ed., 1994) [hereinafter THE LIBERIAN CRISIS]. 
262 See Douglas Rimmer, The Effects of Conflict, II: Economic Effects, in CONFLICT IN AFRICA, 
supra note 96, at 295, 301-02. 
26!1 See Kathryn O'Neill & Barry Munslow, Angola: Ending the Cold War in Southern Africa, in 
CONFLICT IN AFRICA, supra note 96, at 183, 183-88. 
264 See CONFLICT IN AFRICA, supra note 96, at 9. France has intervened on many occasions 
in Chad, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Mauritania, and Niger. See id. 
While Britain has intervened to quash army mutinies in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. See id. 
265 See Neil Weiner, Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi, May 1, 1994 (visited Mar. 12, 
1999) <http://www.backgroundbriefing.com>. 
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of a conflict with both religious and ethnic undercurrents is the Suda-
nese civil war. Sudan is a country that is ethnically and religiously 
divided between the North and the South.266 Shortly after Sudanese 
independence from joint Egyptian and British rule in 1956, the pre-
dominantly black, Christian South took arms to fight for autonomy 
from the Khartoum government, which was controlled by the Muslim 
and Arabic North.267 A settlement of the bloody war was reached in 
1972, whereby the South assumed greater autonomy within a federal 
system of government.268 The war resumed in 1983, when the increas-
ingly fundamentalist government in Khartoum reneged on the 1972 
agreement by adopting Islamic policies like Sharia law and imposing 
them on the southerners.269 
The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement and other liberation 
movements in the South have continued to fight what they perceive as 
internal colonization by the North, while the Khartoum government 
has attempted to crush what it views as an insurgency by infidels against 
Islam.270 Given this degree of polarization, a negotiated settlement in 
the near future is inconceivable. The OAU, in affiliation with the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) , a sub-regional 
body in the Horn of Mrica,271 has attempted to mediate an end to the 
Sudanese conflict, but has avoided direct involvement for fear of pre-
cipitating a fallout between the Islamic states in North Mrica and 
sub-Saharan states that could destroy the unity within the continental 
body.272 
266 See Mohamed Orner Beshir, Conflict and Conflict &.solution in Africa-With Special &fer-
ence to Sudan, in ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY: 25 YEARS ON 131, 141 (Kwesi Krafona ed., 
1988) [hereinafter 25 YEARS ON J. 
267 See id. at 141-44; Peter Woodward, Sudan: War Without End, in CONFLICT IN AFRICA, supra 
note 96, at 92, 92-95. 
268 See Donald Rothchild & Caroline Hartzell, The Peace Process in the Sudan, 1971-1972, in 
STOPPING THE KiLLING, supra note 194, at 80, 85. 
269 See Woodward, supra note 267, at 92, 100--02. 
270 See generaUy Angela M. Lloyd, Note, The Southern Sudan: A Compelling Case far Secession, 
32 COLUM.J. ThANSNAT'L L. 419, 442-51 (1994). 
271 IGAD is composed of Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti. See 
Hagos Ghion, IGAD Ministerial Meeting opens Tuesday, Aug. 3, 1998 (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http: 
/ / search.nando.net! plwe b-cgi/ ... gency% 200n %20developmen t% 29 % 3ATEXT> ; UN, OA U Ag-
ree to Cooperate Further in Peace-Keeping, May 2,1998 (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://search. 
nando.net/plweb-cgi/ ... gency% 200n % 20development%29%3ATEXT> . 
272 See Jonah, supra note 25, at 11. 
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VI. AsSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE OAU IN CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
The performance of the OAU in conflict resolution can be char-
acterized by modest success in a few cases and dismal failure in most 
others. It is important to identifY inroads that the OAU has made and 
the challenges it has faced in its endeavors to establish a lasting peace 
in Mrica. 
Internal conflicts have presented the most daunting challenges to 
the OAU for two reasons. First, where outside powers have been in-
volved, the capacity of the OAU to deal with them was substantially 
eroded.273 This is explained by the fact that extraterritorial forces, as 
part of the United Nations, have more resources and authority than 
the OAU.274 For instance, the superpower interventions in the Congo 
crisis were so pervasive and overwhelming that the OAU efforts to 
nullifY them proved fruitless. 275 Secondly, the OAU lacks the power to 
intervene in internal conflicts. Article III, clause two of the OAU 
Charter explicitly prohibits member states from interfering with the 
internal affairs of other member states.276 This provision has been 
conservatively interpreted and applied so that conflicts within a state 
are placed beyond the purview and jurisdiction of the OAU. The result 
is an artificial and conceptually unrealistic dichotomy between inter-
state and intra-state conflicts, with the OAU having jurisdiction only to 
deal with the former. As is evident to any casual observer of the Mrican 
scene, this distinction is unrealistic. All intra-state conflicts have a 
trans-border "spillover" effect that cannot be ignored by other states. 
As the above case studies show, it is impossible for the OAU to be 
faithful to this distinction. The OAU intervened in one way or another 
in each of the conflicts that could be viewed as internal. In the case of 
Nigeria, for example, the OAU was unable to stay aloof, but because 
the Nigerian federal government insisted that the conflict was an 
internal affair, the OAU intervened in support of the federal govern-
ment.277 Perhaps with its hesitant support of the federal government, 
the OAU thought that it had insulated itself from being accused of 
undermining the sovereign integrity of Nigeria. 
273 See Gordenker. supra note 254. at 115. 
274 See iti. 
275 See id. 
2760AU CHARTER. supra note 29. at art. III. § 2. 
277 See STREMLAU. supra note 235. at 212. 
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However, the OAU has registered some success in the sphere of 
border conflicts, although this was the area that originally presented 
the OAU with the biggest challenge.278 While the colonial boundaries 
established in Africa are arbitrary and unsatisfactory,279 writers and 
observers of the African scene have nonetheless conceded that at-
tempts to redraw the map of Africa will invite unprecedented problems 
and even more conflicts.280 The maintenance of the status quo has 
proven more prudent than attempting to revise borders.281 The OAU 
has consistently conformed to this rule.282 The rule has found juridical 
expression in the legal doctrine of uti possidetis. 283 Although some 
scholars feel otherwise,284 the stability with which the colonial borders 
have been maintained in Africa is astounding, especially when com-
pared to "the three major wars in Latin America fought over frontier 
issues, the three wars between India and Pakistan, the 1962 Sino-Indian 
war, and the extraordinary carnage of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, which 
originated over disputed territory. "285 
Moreover, the role played by the OAU in decolonization cannot 
be overemphasized. Many conflicts in Africa have been initiated by the 
African independent states and liberation movements within the colo-
nial regimes. From its inception, the OAU dedicated itself to the erad-
ication of all vestiges of colonialism from the continent.286 Through its 
278 See Gordenker, supra note 254, at 114. For instance, the OAU contributed to the end of 
the Ethiopia-Somali-Kenya border conflict and the Morocco-Algeria border conflict. See id. 
279 See Mutua, supra note 16, at 1114-15. 
280 See id. at 1114. 
281 See William J. Foltz, The Organization of African Unity and the Resolution of Africa '$ 
Conflicts, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA, supra note 94, at 347, 352-53. 
282 See id. 
283 See Crawford Young, Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity, and the African State System, 
in CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA, supra note 94, at 320, 328. Uti possidetis is a prescriptive 
doctrine that asserts the continuity of Mrican state entities, the transfer of sovereignty from the 
colonial regimes notwithstanding. See id. 
284 See Mutua, supra note 16, at 1114. Mutua writes: 
The juridical statehood attained with the decolonization of the colonial state has 
in the last four decades proved inadequate. It is becoming increasingly apparent 
that these concepts and principles may have trapped Africa in a detrimental time 
capsule; they now seem to be straight jackets with time bombs ready to explode. 
The imposition of the nation-state through colonization balkanized Africa into 
ahistorical units and forcibly yanked it into the Age of Europe, permanently 
disfiguring it. 
Id. at 1114-15. Mutua beautifully describes the problem of colonial borders but does not address 
the fundamental issue of how Africa can go about redrawing its map. See id. 
285 Young, supra note 283, at 332. 
286 See OAU CHARTER, supra note 29, at art. II, § 1 (d), art. III, § 6. 
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Liberation Committee, the OAU gave material and military support to 
various liberation movements and also put diplomatic pressure on the 
United Nations to act.287 For instance, many anti-apartheid resolutions, 
sanctions against South Mrica,288 and resolutions establishing steps 
towards independence for Namibia were drafted at the prodding of 
OAU members at the United Nations.289 The OAU has contributed to 
the independence movements of Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbab-
we.290 Now that apartheid in South Mrica has ended, it can be argued 
that Mrica is finally free from any form of colonial rule.291 
Another significant effort by the OAU to contribute generally to 
peace and stability in the world has been through disarmament. It 
cannot be denied that the presence of highly sophisticated weaponry 
in the world increases insecurity, especially in Africa. The OAU has 
adopted a convention making Mrica a denuclearized zone.292 Through 
this, it has saved Mrica from the costs of an arms race. The OAU has 
also charted a new path in the ongoing search for peace and stability 
based on trust instead of militarism. 293 
All conflicts have a human rights dimension. Conflicts may be 
caused by human rights violations or triggered by attempts to stop 
human rights violations, and they certainly entail human rights viola-
tions.294 The adoption of the Mrican Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights295 is a milestone on the long road towards establishing a culture 
of human rights in Mrica, a prerequisite for peace and stability. The 
287 See SYBESMA-KNOL, supra note l86, at 130-3l. 
288 See United Nations: General Assembly Resolution 48/258 on the Elimination of Apartheid 
and the Establishment of a United, Democratic and Non-Racial South Africa, 33 I.L.M. l055 
(1994). 
289 See United Nations: General Assembly Resolutions on the Question of Namibia, 20 I.L.M. 
516 (1981). 
290 See generally AGBI, supra note l18, at 95-l11 (discussing liberation of former Portugese 
colonies of Angola and Mozambique), 72-9l (discussing formation of Zimbabwe into an inde-
pendent state). 
291 Cf David A. Kay, The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations and the United Nations 
Political Process, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: POLITICS AND PROCESS 307, 323-24 (Leland 
M. Goodrich & David A. Kayeds., 1973) (South Africa considered white colonial regime under 
apartheid) . 
292 See Organization of African Unity: African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, 35 I.L.M. 
698 (1996). 
293 For a discussion of the extensive post-colonial militarization in Africa, see generally Robin 
Luckham, The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and 
Issues, 37 AFR. STUD. REv. l3 (1994). 
294 See generally Pirouet, supra note 101, at 275-94; Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the Rhetoric: 
Reinvigurating the Strugglefur Economic and Social Rights in Africa, 26 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. I (1995). 
295 See Banjui Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, reprinted in 2ll.L.M. 58 (1982). 
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regionalization of human rights through the adoption of the Charter 
is a significant step in Mrican human rights movements in that it marks 
a radical departure from the OAU policy of the 1970s whereby issues 
pertaining to human rights were seen as internal affairs of member 
states. This policy allowed the OAU to close its eyes to the massacres 
of tens of thousands of Hutu in Burundi in 1972-73 as well as mass 
violations of human rights by the notorious regimes of Jean-Bedel 
Bokassa in the Central Mrican Republic, Marcias Nguema in Equitorial 
Guinea,296 and Idi Amin in Uganda.297 
VII. LIMITATIONS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFECTIVE CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION IN AFRICA 
The limitations that have impeded or hindered the capacity of the 
OAU to effettively resolve regional conflicts originate inside and out-
side of the OAU. Hence, this section will first discuss limitations and 
obstacles which denote conceptual, normative, and structural impro-
prieties within the OAU Charter. Next, this section will identify non-
Charter based problems-meaning external factors such as budgetary 
problems and political inertia-that are not attributable to the OAU 
per se, but are products of the economic and political milieu within 
which the OAU operates. 
A. Charter-Based Limitations and Obstacles 
Perhaps the best way to explore the Charter-based limitations and 
obstacles to effective conflict resolution is to examine the conception 
of the OAU. Two competing visions influenced the process and per-
meated the Addis Ababa conference which drafted the OAU Charter. 
The first vision, prominently advocated by the late President Kwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana, conceived of a unitary government, a united state 
of Mrica, that would be able to overcome the historical internal con-
tradictions in Mrica and check external forces. 298 For President Nkru-
mah, this unity was the only way to guarantee security, independence, 
and prosperity for Mrica. He eloquently painted his vision: 
296 See U. O. Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 77 AM. J. INT'L 
l. 902, 903 (1983). 
297 For longer discussion of Amin's regime and atrocities committed under it, see generally 
DAVID GWYN, 1m AMIN: DEATH-LIGHT OF AFRICA (1977); 1m AMIN AND UGANDA: AN ANNOTATED 
BIBLIOGRAPHY (Martin Jamison compiler, 1992). 
298 See OPOKU AGYEMAN, NKRUMAH's GHANA AND EAST AFRICA: PAN-AFRICANISM AND AFRI-
CAN INTERSTATE RELATIONS 30-31 (1992). 
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Our essential bulwark against the sinister threats and other 
multifarious designs of the neocolonialists is in our political 
union. If we are to remain free, if we are to enjoy the full 
benefits of Africa's rich resources, we must unite to plan for 
our total defence and the full exploitation of our material 
and human means, in the full interests of all our peoples. To 
go it alone will limit our horizons, curtail our expectations, 
and threaten our liberty .... Unless we meet the obvious and 
very powerful neocolonialists threats with a unified African 
front, based upon a common economic and defence policy, 
the strategy will be to pick us off and destroy us one by one.299 
The second vision articulated at the Addis Ababa conference was 
conceived by the Monrovia group of states and advocated forcefully by 
Nigeria. This group of states envisioned an amalgamation of African 
states into a continental body based on equal sovereignty of all states, 
which would deal with issues of common concern: 
Nigeria's stand is that if we want unity in Africa, we must 
first agree to certain essential things. The first is that African 
States must respect one another. There must be acceptance 
of equality by all the states. No matter whether they are big 
or small, they are all sovereign and their sovereignty is sover-
eignty.30o 
The Charter that emerged from the conference was therefore a 
compromise document which represented both views of Africa, but 
used the second vision as the core of the Charter. Like all compromise 
documents that are tailored to meet political expediency3Dl rather than 
designed to confront the problems and challenges facing the member 
states, the OAU Charter lost its cutting edge.302 
299Kwesi Krafona, Introduction to 25 YEARS ON, supra note 266, at 1, 1 (quoting KWAME 
NKRUMAH, AFRICA MUST UNITE xvii (1985». 
800 AGBI, supra note 118, at ll6 (quoting Nigerian Prime-Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa). 
30) See, e.g., John Marcum, Huw Wide is the Gap Between Casablanca and Monrovia?, 7 AFR. 
REp. 3 (1962) (describing the numerous positions being taken by African nations just before the 
formation of the OAU and its Charter in 1963). 
302 See, e.g., Thomas Nsenga Kanza, Africa Must Change, in 25 YEARS ON, supra note 266, at 
146,146 (noting that 25 years after founding ofOAU, Africa has "no peace, no stability, and no 
credibility"); W. Scott Thompson Be Richard Bissell, Legitimacy and Authority in the OAlJ, 15 AFR. 
STUD. REv. 17, 27 (1972) (reviewing the first nine years of the OAU and concluding that it is 
ineffective) . 
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However, attributing the weaknesses of the OAU to its process of 
creation is to address the problem only partially. The OAU is a creature 
of international law, and the weaknesses of the OAU are, by and large, 
those of the international legal system itself. Over the centuries, inter-
national law has exalted the concept of sovereignty as the bedrock of 
relations between nations.303 State borders are considered sacrosanct, 
and a state's attempt to exert influence over what happens within 
another state's borders is considered contrary to international law.304 
The international organizations that emerged were, therefore, loose 
associations of sovereign states designed to promote .only the essential 
and minimum international relations, without offending the tenet of 
sovereign equality between member states. The member states still 
functioned as self-contained units with full decision-making power. 
Ellen Frey-Wouters eloquently captures the weakness inherent in re-
gional organizations based on this flawed conceptualization of inter-
national relations: 
The limited character of existing regional institutions shapes 
their response to internal conflict. The decision-making proc-
ess of the Organization of American States, the Organization 
of Mrican Unity, and the League of Arab States is of an 
intergovernmental character. There is no supranational re-
gional center of power above the member states; the regional 
system is limited to direct interaction between the power 
centers of the member units. The regional secretariats are 
merely administrative organs, exercising no executive power 
and entrusted with little scope for independent initiative.305 
505The classical definition of sovereignty is provided by Jean Bodin as "that absolute and 
perpetual power" within a single state's boundaries. JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH 25 (MJ. Tooley trans., 1955). Although the concept of state sovereignty has evolved over 
the years, starting from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the modern concept of sovereignty still 
poses monumental problems. See generally CAROLINE THOMAS, NEW STATES, SOVEREIGNTY AND 
INTERVENTION (1985). 
504 See THOMAS, supra note 303, at 48. The crisis of the OAU is, therefore, to a large extent 
the crisis of international law itself, as it grapples with the challenge of confronting the realities 
of the ever changing nature of the subjects and objects of international relations. Grossman and 
Bradlaw capture this crisis when they write: "The deficiencies of the present international legal 
order based on the de jure sovereignty of the nation-state and a relatively clear distinction between 
international and domestic legal issues are obvious. The nation-state is no longer functionally 
'the master of its own territory.'" Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being PropeUed 
Tawards a People-Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'y I, 22 (1993). 
505Frey-Wouters, supra note 106, at 460. 
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The founders of the OAD were, therefore, following the edicts of 
international law by incorporating its classic norms into the OAD 
Charter. An examination of the normative and institutional struc-
ture of the OAD will clarify this point. 
1. Conceptual and Normative Weaknesses 
The classic international law principle of sovereign equality of all 
states, enshrined in Article III, clause one of the OAU Charter, forms 
the core of the OAU's normative structure. 306 All other norms only 
serve to reinforce this overarching principle. For example, the princi-
ple of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and 
the prohibition of subversive activities are geared towards the protec-
tion of state sovereignty.307 Additionally, the OAU Assembly of Heads 
of State and Governments and the Council of Ministers passed many 
resolutions aimed at safeguarding state sovereignty. As Professor 
Borella observes, it is understandable that the infant OAU sought to 
strengthen the weak Mrican states that were emerging from colonial 
subjugation: "Created only a few years after the independence of many 
Mrican States it was normal that the continental Organization should 
devote itself to the OAU Charter objective of defending their sover-
eignty, their territorial integrity and their independence."308 
That may be so, but there is a need for the OAU to evolve parallel 
to international law and the changing times. There is no denying that 
the concepts of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states are fundamental concepts in the United ~ations Char-
ter and customary international law. 309 However, while the United Na-
tions Security Council has interpreted these concepts restrictively and 
utilized its Chapter VII powers to deal with internal situations within 
member states, especially after the end of the Cold War, the OAU has 
dogmatically and conservatively continued to observe these norms, 
allowing conflicts to rage on in Mrica unabated.310 This contrast be-
3060AU CHARTER, supra note 29, at art. III, § 1. Article III, § 1 reads: 'The Member States 
. . . solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles: 1. The sovereign 
equality of all Member States." Id. 
307 See Michel-Cyr Djiena Wembou, The OAU and International Law, in THE OAU AFTER 
THIRTY YEARS, supra note 25, at 15, 17. 
308Id. at 16. 
309 See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 31, at art. 2, para. 4, 7. 
m See S.K.B. Asante, The Role of the Organization of African Unity in Promoting Peace, Devel-
opment and Regional Security in Africa, in PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE, supra note 124, at 123, 127. 
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tween the global United Nations and the regional DAU is illustrated 
in the following examples. 
In December, 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 794, authorizing the Secretary-General, in tandem with 
cooperating member states, "to help create a secure environment for 
the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia. "311 The Security Council 
was interpreting its Chapter VII powers expansively to deal with an 
internal conflict within a member state when it expressed a determi-
nation to "restore peace, stability, and law and order with a view to 
facilitating the process of a political settlement under the auspices of 
the United Nations, aimed at national reconciliation in Somalia. "!!I2 
Although it failed to achieve its objective, the Somalia operation un-
equi~ocally marked the beginning of activist post-Cold War Security 
Council interventions in matters previously regarded as internal affairs 
of member states.!!13 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 on Haiti3I4 repre-
sents a further step away from the concepts of absolute sovereignty of 
states and non-interference with internal affairs of member states. 
Through this Resolution, the Security Council authorized the interven-
tion of a multinational force in Haiti to restore ousted President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide and remove the military junta that ousted him from 
power.315 Such is the elastic interpretation of Chapter VII that a coup 
d'etat can be termed as "a threat to the [international] peace" neces-
sitating Security Council enforcement action.316 
While this evolution is occurring within the United Nations,!ll7 the 
DAU continues to stringently observe the norms of sovereign equality 
of member states and non-interference with internal affairs of member 
states in a fashion clearly out of tune with present reality. Since all 
511 BLUE HELMETS, sufrra note 181, at 294. 
512 1993 U.N.V.B. 209 (quoting Security Council Resolution Number 794). 
SIS See Ruth Gordon, United Natims Interoention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Sumalia, and 
Beyond, 15 MICH.]' hn'L L. 519, 544-45 (1994). 
514 See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 181, at 623. 
515 See id. 
516 Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention Through the United Natims: Tuwards the 
Development of Criteria, 53 ZAoRV (HEIDELBERG J. INT'L. L.) 557,564--66 (1993). 
517It may be recalled that the reassertion of the principle of sovereignty over natural re-
sources and economic programs even within the United Nations during the first few decades 
after World War II was spearheaded by the members of the OAU within the United Nations in 
tandem with other developing countries, through a series of resolutions in the General Assembly. 
For a discussion of these resolutions see generally CHANGING PRIORITIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
AGENDA: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 1981). 
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member states are regarded as equal sovereigns, their territorial integ-
rity must be observed by all, which involves religiously adhering to the 
norm of non-interference with internal affairs of member states and 
the inviolability of state boundaries.318 Devastating conflicts and con-
comitant humanitarian crises are raging from the Horn of Mrica 
(Sudan and Somalia) to the heart of Mrica (Rwanda, Burundi and 
Zaire). 
This state of affairs does not bode well for the future of the DAU. 
The DAU needs to re-evaluate its role. If the DAU does not develop 
its own formula for dealing with internal conflicts, unilateral interven-
tion by member states will become the new norm and, slowly but surely, 
the DAU will be pushed to political limbo. Tanzania's intervention in 
Uganda in 1979 is a case in point.319 The intervention of ECDMDG in 
the Liberian civil war, if successful in restoring civil order and stability 
in Liberia, may mark the beginning of a shift of power from the 
continental body of the DAU to sub-regional groups that have the will 
and the means to act.!I20 
2. Institutional and Structural Limitations 
Apart from the normative weaknesses inherent in the DAU Char-
ter, various institutional and structural anomalies constrain the capac-
ity of the DAU to play an effective role in resolving regional conflicts. 
Chief among them is the division of duties among the DAU's principal 
organs. As previously explained, the Charter creates four "principal 
institutions": the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the 
Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat, and the Commission of 
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.!I21 The Charter further clothes 
these institutions with varying degrees of powers.!122 
Closer scrutiny reveals, however, that the ~sembly is the organ 
with real power; the other organs are just ancillaries to the Assembly 
with no meaningful powers of their own.!I23 The Assembly is the "su-
~18 See William J. Foltz, The Organization of African Unity and the Resolution of Africa's 
Conflicts, in CONFLICT REsOLUTION IN AFRICA, supra note 94, at 347, 352. 
~19 See TONY AVIRGAN Be MARTHA HONEY, WAR IN UGANDA: THE LEGACY OF IDI AMIN 53-95 
(1982). 
~20 For a study of this precedent-setting peace-keeping initiative by the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) read THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 261. 
~21 See OAU CHARTER, supra note 29, at art. VII. 
~22 See id. at am. VIII-XIX. 
~2~ See supra Part IIIA. 
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preme organ," combining executive and judicial powers with general 
supervisory power over all of the other organs.324 The Assembly may 
"review the structure, functions and acts of all the other organs and 
any specialized agencies .... "325 In contrast, the Council of Ministers 
is confined to preparing conferences for the Assembly, implementing 
its decisions and taking "cognisance of any matter referred to it by the 
Assembly. "326 As for the Secretariat, the Charter does not confer any 
significant role for the Secretary-General under whom the Secretariat 
is supposed to function. 327 
An examination of the history of the OAU reveals that the foun-
ders wanted to retain all important duties for the Assembly and prevent 
the Secretary-General from playing any politically significant role-
hence the title "Administrative Secretary-General. "328 This asymmetry 
of power and monopolization of initiative by the Assembly has not 
worked very well for the OAU. Indeed, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's pre-
diction shortly after the OAU inaugural conference that drafted the 
Charter remains true today: 
It would be presumptuous to pass judgment on the Organi-
zation at this stage, but one cannot help noticing that ex-
tremely broad powers have been bestowed upon the Assembly 
of Heads of State. When these powers are considered in 
relation to those already enjoyed by each head of state in his 
own country, it becomes obvious that the Assembly is the only 
real organ of the OAU .... The Council [of Ministers] has 
virtually no authority of its own. If this is true of the second 
ranking organ of the OAU, it applies even more to the other 
organs .... There does seem to be a trend toward an "Mrica 
of Heads of State."329 
A comparison of the role of the OAU Secretary-General and that 
of his or her United Nations counterpart reveals the minimal role that 
the OAU Charter drafters intended the Secretary-General to play.330 
Apart from the administrative duties endowed on the United Nations 
Secretary-General by Article 97 of the United Nations Charter, Article 
324 See OAU CHARTER, supra note 29, at arts. VIII, IX, X, XXVII. 
325Id. at art. VIII. 
326Id. at art. XIII. 
327 See id. at art. XVI. 
328Jonah, supra note 25, at 5. 
329BoUTROS-GHALl, supra note 28, at 45. 
330 See Jonah, supra note 25, at 4-5. 
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98 confers the Secretary-General with the authority to make and sub-
mit annual reports to the General Assembly on the work of the United 
Nations. More importantly, Article 99 empowers the Secretary-General 
"to bring to the atten tion of the Security Council any matter which in 
his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and 
security. "331 The powers of the United Nations Secretary-General to in-
vestigate situations that are likely to endanger peace and use his or her 
"good offices" to resolve conflicts, emanate from these provisions.332 
Provisions similar to Articles 98 and 99 of the United Nations 
Charter are missing in the OAU Charter.333 The founders of the OAU 
did not want the Secretary-General to proactively use his or her good 
offices to resolve conflicts or take any independent diplomatic initia-
tive, lest it be interpreted as arrogating to the office a visible policy-
making role.334 It takes a Secretary-General of exceptional personal 
abilities to overcome these legal hurdles and playa meaningful role in 
dispute resolution. 
One might argue that sitting OAU Chairmen have been able to 
fulfill this crucial role and that, therefore, it is not necessary to confer 
such powers on the OAU's Secretary-GeneraP35 While it is true that 
sitting OAU Chairmen have, in practice, played this role traditionally 
meant for the Secretary-General, the OAU Charter does not envision 
such a role for the occupants of this office.336 It is acceptable to the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government that the Chairman play 
such a role since, as a head of state, he is at par with his peers in the 
Assembly and it is essentially the Assembly exercising that power. Thus, 
the danger of a powerful Secretary-General does not arise. However, 
the problem is that the Chairman is too busy with other state respon-
sibilities to find time to personally play an effective and meaningful 
role in conflict resolution. Ideally, this role belongs to the OAU Secre-
tary-General. 
m U.N. CHARTER, art. 97, 98, 99, reprinted in U.N. CHARTER, supra note 31, at xxxv-xxxvi. 
332 See Jonah, supra note 25, at 5. 
333 See id. 
334 See ESEDEBE, supra note 4, at 197. 
335 See Jonah, supra note 25, at 5-6. 
336 See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 18, at 79. Rule lO of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government describes the role of the chairman as that of chairing 
and directing meetings, and ensuring order and decorum of the proceedings of the Assembly. 
See id. The diplomatic role played by the Chairman in resolving conflict is a creature of practice 
that has no basis in the OAU juridical order. See id. 
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The lack of an enforcement organ akin to the United Nations 
Security Council is another problem within the OAU "constitutional 
order."337 There is a definite need to create such an organ with the 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of regional peace and se-
curity. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, like the 
United Nations General Assembly, is too large and contains too many 
diverse opinions to be able to make timely decisions of magnitude and 
to implement them with the necessary speed. The Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government is not even bestowed with disciplinary or 
enforcement powers.338 
Another anomaly of the OAU Charter is its proscriptive decision-
making process. For a meeting of either the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government or the Council of Ministers to take place, two-thirds 
of the members must be present to constitute aquorum, and further-
more, any decision of the Assembly must be agreed upon by two-thirds 
of the total membership of the organization.33g This threshold for a 
quorum may jeopardize the proper functioning of the organization. 
This lends credence to the assertion that the OAU Charter has an 
inherent tendency to encourage inaction, delay, and ineffectiveness.340 
Closely connected to this is the OAU's over-reliance on consensus 
in general decision-making and on informal structures in dispute reso-
lution. Consensus and diplomatic resolution of disputes are important, 
but there are limitations. The OAU's over-reliance on diplomacy and 
ad hoc procedures has resulted in temporary resolutions of many 
disputes which resurface later in greater magnitude because diplo-
matic solutions rarely address the underlying substance of a dispute.341 
Therefore, the creation of a judicial organ within the OAU legal 
regimes is necessary as an alternative or supplement to diplomatic 
means. 
~37 See generally U.N. CHARTER Chapter V, Chapter VII, reprinted in U.N. CHARTER, supra note 
31 (describing basic composition and powers of Security Council and the powers available when 
there is a breach of "international peace and security"). 
~~8 See Asante, supra note 310, at 128. 
~39 See Rules 14 and 25 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government, and Rule 18 of the Rules of Procedure of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the 
Organization of African Unity, reproduced in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 18, at 80, 82, 88. 
340 See Foltz, supra note 281, at 350. 
341 For example, the Ethiopia-Somalia border conflict was superficially solved by the OAU 
only to resurface later in a greater magnitude. See supra Part VA.l.b. 
----------------------_.-----
590 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:537 
B. Non-Charter Based Obstacles 
Many other factors external to the mechanics of the OAU have 
similarly curtailed the effectiveness of the OAU. While it is beyond the 
scope of this article to examine them in detail, it is important to 
mention some of them briefly. The dominant external factor is the 
OAU's general lack of financial resources. More than any other re-
gional organization, the OAU, since its formation, has experienced 
debilitating budgetary problems.342 It is impossible to divorce an or-
ganization from the socio-economic environment within which it func-
tions. The financial ill-health of the OAU is intertwined with the 
economic conditions of the African states which form its membership. 
As the economic situation in Africa improves, the financial position of 
the OAU should follow suit. 
Political inertia also continues to bog down the organization.343 
The OAU could be reinvigorated by re-drafting its Charter. Closely 
related to this problem of political inertia is what has been referred to 
as a legitimacy crisis within the OAU. Due to a lack of effectiveness in 
enforcing its will and its general aloofness in the face of internal 
conflicts, some member states have dared to take independent posi-
tions on conflicts without receiving any sanctions from the OAU.344 
In sum, the OAU Charter is replete with structural and norma-
tive anomalies which render the OAU a very weak body for regional 
conflict resolution. There is an urgent need to overhaul the Charter 
in order to strengthen its institutional and normative structure and 
eliminate its archaic international law concepts that have no place in 
today's increasingly interdependent world. In particular, a new Charter 
should create an effective executive organ that can respond to the 
conflict resolution and management needs of a highly volatile region. 
The office of the Secretary-General also needs to be empowered. 
Furthermore, the OAU would benefit from the creation of a judicial 
organ buttressed with compulsory jurisdiction over inter-state disputes. 
Anachronistic norms such as non-interference with internal affairs of 
member states and inviolability of state frontiers must be discarded or 
342 See Asante, supra note 310, at 129. 
343 See Foltz, supra note 281, at 350. 
344 See Thompson & Bissell, supra note 302, at 18. For example, four member states recog-
nized Biafra without any protest from the OAU. See id. Others do not pay their dues and other 
financial obligations and the OAU cannot do anything. See id. at 29, 32-33. For a discussion of 
these and other factors that show the erosion of legitimacy and authority of the OAU, read 
generally Thompson & Bissell, supra note 302. 
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reinterpreted to cope with the conflict resolution needs of our time 
and of Mrica. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has explored the role of the OAU in regional conflict 
resolution and dispute settlement. The introduction provides a 
glimpse into the historical origins as well as the normative and institu-
tional structure of the OAU. The OAU was seen as a slave of time. It 
was created at a period when nationalism and sovereign integrity of 
states were the foremost concepts in international relations-especially 
for Mrican states which were emerging from colonial subjugation. The 
OAU thus assimilated and entrenched these concepts into its architec-
tural foundation. Until recently, the OAU remained a highly conser-
vative institution unresponsive to the changing times. Its unprece-
dented attempt to nullifY the military coup in Sierra Leone has been 
viewed as an attempt on the part of the OAU to come to terms with 
the changing realities of inter-state relations. The OAU now no longer 
seems to be prepared to treat internal conflicts and human rights as 
internal matters to be addressed only by the affected state. This appar-
ent behavioral change may not last long, however; it faces the danger 
of being undermined by the ultra-conservative forces within the OAU 
if it is not accompanied by an overhaul of the OAU Charter to incor-
porate the new paradigms. 
The paper goes further to characterize conflicts in Mrica and to 
examine the OAU conflict resolution initiatives. Although the OAU 
has been effective in resolving inter-state conflict, its performance in 
resolving intra-state conflicts is found to be wanting. This is attributed 
to the practically and theoretically untenable dichotomy the OAU 
Charter creates between intra-state and inter-state conflicts, placing 
intra-state conflicts beyond the purview of the OAU. In a world so 
interdependent and closely linked together, such compartmentaliza-
tion of conflicts is simplistic and unrealistic. Purely internal or inter-
national conflicts do not exist. Inter-state conflicts have internal causes, 
while so-called internal conflicts have international repercussions (like 
outflows of refugees and armed insurgencies into neighboring states) 
that cannot be ignored by the affected states. 
Impediments to effective conflict resolution on the part of the 
OAU have also been explored. These impediments are found to be 
both Charter based and non-Charter based. At the institutional level, 
an asymmetry of power between the Assembly of Heads of States and 
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Government and other organs of the OAU is built into the Charter. 
The juridical and extrajuridical power of the Assembly is found to be 
so complete and pervasive that it overwhelms and emasculates the 
other organs. Specific suggestions on how this unsatisfactory state of 
affairs can be rectified include the empowerment of the office of the 
Secretary-General and the creation of a judicial and enforcement or-
gan within the OAU institutional framework. 
A holistic appreciation of the role the OAU has played in address-
ing the chronic problem of conflict in Africa-perhaps the most criti-
cal challenge of our time-is a prerequisite to offering solutions. In 
this quest, several fundamental questions and answers are apparent. 
The question whether the OAU has been effective in resolving regional 
conflicts is answered in the negative. The ongoing debilitating conflicts 
in Africa testify to this fact. The answer to the question why the OAU 
has been ineffective is located in both the historical underpinnings and 
the normative structure of the OAU. However, the OAU is credited 
with playing a leading role in wiping out the scourge of colonialism 
(at least in its classical form), which was a major source of conflicts. 
On the whole, it must be concluded that nothing short of an 
overhaul of the Charter of the OAU will cure the anomalies afflicting 
the organization. This calls for political will on the part of the member 
states. Archaic norms that have done a lot of disservice to the African 
region must be replaced by new ones. The OAU must be empowered 
and rejuvenated by restructuring its institutions to cope with the vital 
role of resolving conflicts. A mere window dressing exercise will not 
suffice. Most importantly, a new and revitalized OAU must make the 
promotion and protection of human rights a fundamental norm in-
corporated into its Charter and central to any conflict resolution in-
itiative. After all, protection of human rights is a matter of course in 
international relations today. In any case, after all is said and done, 
there is no other ethical justification for the existence of any institu-
tion, indeed even the state itself, other than the welfare of human-
kind-the promotion and protection of human rights in the broadest 
meaning of the term. 
